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Abstract
Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. It is generally
di¢ cult to nd observable fundamentals that are useful for predicting whether a boom
will turn into a bust or not. We develop a model consistent with these observations.
Agents have heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals but change their
views because of social dynamics.Agents with tighter priors are more likely to con-
vert others to their beliefs. Boom-bust episodes typically occur when skeptical agents
happen to be correct. The booms that are not followed by busts typically occur when
optimistic agents happen to be correct.
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1 Introduction
Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. It is generally di¢ cult
to nd observable fundamentals that are useful for predicting whether a boom will turn
into a bust or not. We develop a model that is consistent with this observation. Agents
have heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals. Some agents are optimistic
while others are not. Agents change their views as a result of social dynamics. They
meet randomly and those with tighter priors are more likely to convert other agents to their
beliefs. The model generates a fad in the sense that the fraction of the population with
a particular view rises and then falls. These fads lead to boom-busts or protracted booms
in house prices, even if uncertainty about fundamentals is not realized. According to our
model, an econometrician would not be able to predict whether a boom will turn into a bust
or not. That is because before uncertainty is realized, the data are not informative about
which agent is correct.1
Our model has three features. First, there is uncertainty about the long-run fundamentals
that drive house prices. We assume that in each period, there is a small probability that
housing fundamentals will change permanently to a new value. This emphasis on long-run
fundamentals is related to the literature on long-run risk (Bansal and Yaron (2004), and
Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008)).
Second, as in Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Dumas, Kurshev, and
Uppal (2009), and Geanakoplos (2010), agents in our economy have heterogenous beliefs
about fundamentals. Some agents believe that housing fundamentals will improve while
others dont. Agents can update their priors in a Bayesian fashion. However, the data do
not convey useful information about long-run fundamentals, so agentspriors stay constant
over time. In other words, agents agree to disagree and this disagreement persists over time.
One group of agents is correct in their views about future fundamentals, but there is no way
to know ex-ante which group that is.
The third feature of the model is an element which we refer to as social dynamics.
1Models in which agents have homogeneous expectations can also generate protracted movements in house
prices (see e.g. Zeira (1999) and Chu (2014)). But, these models generally imply a close relation between
house prices and fundamentals that is di¢ cult to see in the data. Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) argue that
it is di¢ cult to explain the observed large changes in house prices with changes in incomes, amenities or
interest rates.
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Agents meet randomly with each other and some agents change their priors about long-run
fundamentals as a result of these meetings. We use the entropy of an agents probability
distribution of future fundamentals to measure the uncertainty of his views. We assume
that when agent i meets agent j, the probability that i adopts the prior of j is decreasing
(increasing) in the entropy of the prior of i (j). In other words, agents with tighter priors
are more likely to convert other agents to their beliefs. Our model generates dynamics
in the fraction of agents who hold di¤erent views that are similar to those generated by
the infectious disease models proposed by Bernoulli (1766) and Kermack and McKendrick
(1927).2
We consider two cases. In the rst case, the agents with the tightest priors are those who
expect fundamentals to remain the same. In the second case, the agents with the tightest
priors are those who expect fundamentals to improve. Absent realization of uncertainty
about long-run fundamentals, the model generates fads. In the rst case, there is a rise and
fall in the number of people who believe that buying a house is a good investment. Here,
the model generates a protracted boom-bust cycle. In the second case, there is a rise and
fall in the number of people who believe that housing fundamentals will not change. Here,
the model generates a protracted boom in housing prices that is not followed by a bust.
We use the model to compute the price path expected by di¤erent agents. These uncon-
ditional expected price paths take into account the probability of uncertainty being realized
at each point in time. Regardless of which agent happens to be correct, the model has the
following implications. Agents who think that fundamentals will improve expect prices to
rise and then level o¤. Agents who think fundamentals will not change expect prices to
rise and then fall. An econometrician taking repeated samples from data generated by the
model would see both boom-busts and booms that are not followed by busts. The boom-bust
episodes typically occur in economies where agents who dont expect fundamentals to im-
prove happen to be correct. The episodes in which booms are not followed by busts typically
occur in economies where agents who expect fundamentals to improve happen to be correct.
Of course, in any given economy an econometrician would not be able to predict ex-ante
which type of episode would occur.
We rst study the implications of social dynamics in a frictionless asset pricing model of
2There is a growing literature that provides evidence on the importance of social dynamics in equity
markets. See, e.g. Kelly and Ó. Gráda (2000), Duo and Saez (2002), Brown, Ivkovi´c, Smith, and Weisbenner
(2008), Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), and Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008).
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the housing market. While useful for building intuition, the model is too stylized to account
for various features of the data. For this reason, we embed our model of social dynamics into
a matching model of the housing market of the sort considered by Piazzesi and Schneider
(2009). As these authors show, a small number of optimists can have a large impact on
housing prices. However, heterogeneity in beliefs per se is not enough to generate protracted
booms or booms and busts of the sort observed in the data. Here, social dynamics play a key
role by changing the fraction of agents who hold di¤erent views about future fundamentals.
In our model these changes introduce non-trivial dynamics into house prices.
We calibrate the six parameters of our model that control the distribution of beliefs
and their dynamics to match nine moments constructed from micro evidence on agents
expectations of future house prices and self-assessed value of agentshomes. Even though
we work with an overidentied system, our model does a good job at accounting for the
moments that we target. We choose a separate set of parameters so that the steady state of
the model is consistent with long-run properties of the U.S. housing market.
The data on expectations come from Case and Shiller (2010). In each year that we
have the survey data, we include the following moments in the calibration procedure: The
mean, across those surveyed, of the one-year ahead expected increase in home prices, and
the di¤erence between the mean and median of the same forecast. The rst set of moments
is relevant for obvious reasons: We want our model of social dynamics to be consistent with
the expected house-price appreciation during the recent boom-bust episode. The second set
of moments is relevant because, in a model with homogeneous expectations, the di¤erence
between the mean and median expected appreciation in house prices is zero. In contrast,
our model does well at capturing the average value of this statistic over the boom part of
the episode.
The data on self-assessed values of agents homes comes from the American Housing
Survey. These data reveal that, as U.S. house prices appreciated, the gap between the mean
and median values of what agents reported their homes were worth widened. Social dynamics,
which imply a rise in the number of optimistic agents during the boom, provide a natural
explanation for this widening gap. Our model does quite well at accounting for the di¤erences
between the self-assessed mean minus median home values reported in the American Housing
Survey for the 2003-06 period, which are moments targeted by our calibration procedure.
Signicantly, the model is also consistent with the magnitude and rise in the mean relative
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to median self-assessed home values before 2003. It does so even though these moments
are not targeted by our calibration procedure. Social dynamics are the key to the models
success along this dimension since they generate a cross-section of beliefs that evolves over
time.
Finally, we present some evidence on three other central implications of our model. First,
booms (busts) are marked by increases (decreases) in the number of agents who buy homes
only because of large expected capital gains. Second, the probability of selling a home is
positively correlated with house prices. Third, sales volume is positively correlated with
house prices. We nd support for all three implications in the data. More generally, we
argue that the extensive margin of the number of potential home buyers plays a critical role
in house price dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the implica-
tions of social dynamics in a frictionless asset-pricing model of the housing market. Section
3 presents a simple matching model of the housing market and describes its transition dy-
namics. Section 4 incorporates social dynamics into the matching model and generates our
main results. We discuss the model calibration procedure in Section 5 and the models quan-
titative properties in Section 6. In Section 7 we present empirical evidence regarding the key
mechanisms at work in the model. Section 8 contains concluding remarks.
2 Social dynamics in a frictionless model
In this section we consider a simple frictionless model of the housing market. We use this
model to describe the role played by social dynamics and the implied movements in the
fraction of agents with di¤erent beliefs about long-run fundamentals.
The model economy The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with measure
one. All agents have linear utility and discount utility at rate . Agents are either home
owners or renters. To simplify, we assume that each agent can only own one house. One
characteristic that distinguishes houses from stocks and other assets, is that houses cannot
be sold short. So, we assume that there is no short selling in our model.3
3We use the conventional meaning of the expression short sale, which is a transaction in which an
invester borrows an asset and sells it with the promise to return it at a later date. In the recent crisis, the
term short salehas been used with a di¤erent meaning. It refers to a situation in which the houses sale
price falls short of the mortage value and the bank agrees to accept the proceeds of the sale in lieu of the
mortgage balance.
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For simplicity, we assume that there is a xed stock of houses, k < 1, in the economy. This
assumption is motivated by the observation that large booms and busts occur in cities where
increases in the supply of houses are limited by zoning laws, land scarcity, or infrastructure
constraints.4 There is a rental market with 1   k houses. These units are produced by
competitive rms at a cost of w per period, so the rental rate is constant and equal to w.
The momentary utilities of owning and renting a house are "h and "r, respectively. We assume
that the utility of owning a home is higher than the net utility of renting ("h > "r   w), so
that home prices are positive.
We rst consider the equilibrium of a version of the economy with no uncertainty. Agents
decide at time t whether they will be renters or home owners at time t+ 1. The net utility
of being a renter at time t + 1 is "r   w. If an agent buys a house at time t, he pays Pt.
At time t + 1, he lives in the home and receives an utility ow "h. The agent can sell the
house at the end of period t+1 for a price Pt+1. Since all agents are identical, in equilibrium
they must be indi¤erent between buying and renting a house. So, house prices satisfy the
following equation:
 Pt + 
 
Pt+1 + "
h

=  ("r   w) . (1)
The stationary solution to this equation is:
P =

1   ", (2)
where " = "h   ("r   w).5
We now consider an experiment that captures the e¤ects of infrequent changes in the
value of housing fundamentals. Examples include low-frequency changes in the growth rate
of productivity which a¤ects agentswealth and changes in nancial regulation or innovations
which make it easier for agents to purchase homes. For concreteness, we focus on the utility
of owning a home. Suppose that, before time zero, the economy is in a steady state with no
uncertainty, so Pt = P . At time zero, agents learn that in each period, with small probability
, the value of " changes permanently to a new level, ". Agents agree about the value of 
but disagree about the probability distribution of ". Agents do not receive any information
4See, e.g. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), Quigley and Raphael (2005), Barlevy and Fisher (2010),
and Saiz (2010).
5It is well known that there are explosive solutions to equation (1) (see, e.g. Diba and Grossman (1987)).
We abstract from these solutions in our analysis.
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useful to update their priors about the distribution of ".6 As soon as uncertainty is resolved,
agents become homogeneous in their beliefs.
Prior to the resolution of uncertainty, agents fall into three categories depending on their
priors about ". We refer to these agents as optimistic,skeptical,and vulnerable,with
the fraction of agents of each type being denoted, respectively, by ot, st, and vt. Agents
types are publicly observable, and variables that depend on type are indexed by j = o; s; v.
Priors are common knowledge, so higher-order beliefs play no role in our model. The laws
of social dynamics described below are public information. Agents take into account future
changes in the fractions of the population that hold di¤erent views.
The new value of the ow utility of owning a home, ", is drawn from the set . For
simplicity, we assume that this set contains n elements. An agent of type j attaches the
probability distribution function (pdf) f j(") to the elements of .
We assume that, at time zero, there is a very small fraction of skeptical and optimistic
agents. Almost all agents are vulnerable, i.e. they have di¤use priors about future funda-
mentals. Optimistic agents expect an improvement in fundamentals:
Eo(") > ".
Skeptical and vulnerable agents do not expect fundamentals to improve:
Es(") = Ev(") = ".
For now, we assume that agents do not internalize the possibility of changing their type
as a result of social interactions. This assumption rules out actions that are optimal only
because agents might change their type in the future. For example, a skeptical agent might
buy a home, even though this action is not optimal given his current priors, because there
is a chance he might become optimistic in the future. We return to this issue at the end of
this section.
We use the entropy of the probability distribution f j(") to measure the uncertainty of
an agents views,
ej =  
nX
i=1
f j("i ) ln

f j("i )

.
6If agents disagreed about the value of  they would update their priors about  after observing whether
a change in fundamentals occurred. We abstract from uncertainty about the value of  to focus our analysis
on the importance of social dynamics.
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The higher is the value of ej, the greater is agent js uncertainty about ". This uncertainty
is maximal when the pdf is uniform, in which case ej = ln(n).
Agents meet randomly at the beginning of the period. When agent l meets agent j,
j adopts the prior of l with probability lj. The value of lj depends on the ratio of the
entropies of the agentspdfs:
lj = max(1  el=ej; 0). (3)
This equation implies that a low-entropy agent does not adopt the prior of a high-entropy
agent. In addition, it implies that the probability that a high-entropy agent adopts the
priors of the low-entropy agent is decreasing in the ratio of the two entropies. We use this
formulation for two reasons. First, it strikes us as plausible. Second, it is consistent with
evidence from the psychology literature that people are more persuaded by those who are
condent (e.g. Price and Stone (2004) and Sniezek and Van Swol (2001)).
Throughout, we assume that the entropy of vulnerable agents exceeds the entropy of
skeptical and optimistic agents:
es < ev, eo < ev.
So, the vulnerable are the most likely to change their views. In addition, we make the
natural assumption that most agents are vulnerable at time zero and that the initial number
of optimistic and skeptical agents is small and identical: o0 = s0.
The population dynamics generated by our model are similar to those implied by the
infectious-disease models of Bernoulli (1766) and Kermack and McKendrick (1927).7 We
consider two cases. In the rst, the prior of the skeptical agents has the lowest entropy.
In the second, the prior of the optimistic agents has the lowest entropy. In both cases, if
uncertainty is not resolved, the entire population converges to the view of the agent with the
lowest entropy. The model generates a fad, in the sense that the fraction of the population
with the second lowest entropy rises and then falls.
Case one In this case, the pdf of the skeptical agents has the lowest entropy:
es < eo < ev.
7Bernoulli (1766) used his model of the spread of smallpox to show that vaccination would result in a sig-
nicant increase in life expectancy. When vaccination was introduced, insurance companies used Bernoullis
life-expectancy calculations to revise the price of annuity contracts (Dietz and Heesterbeek (2002)).
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The fractions of optimistic, skeptical and vulnerable agents in the population evolve accord-
ing to:
ot+1 = ot + 
ovotvt   sootst; (4)
st+1 = st + 
svstvt + 
sootst, (5)
vt+1 = vt   ovotvt   svstvt. (6)
To understand equation (4), note that there are otvt encounters between optimistic and
vulnerable agents.8 As a result of these encounters, ovotvt vulnerable agents become op-
timistic. Similarly, there are stot encounters between skeptical and optimistic agents. As
a result of these encounters, sostot optimistic agents become skeptical. These two sets of
encounters and the value of ot determine ot+1.
Consider next equation (5). There are otst encounters between skeptical and optimistic
agents, which lead sootst optimistic agents to become skeptical. There are also stvt encoun-
ters between skeptical and vulnerable agents, which lead svstvt vulnerable agents to become
skeptical. Finally, equation (6) implies that the fraction of vulnerable agents declines over
time because ovotvt vulnerable agents become optimistic and svstvt become skeptical.
Consider a path of the economy along which uncertainty is not realized. In case one, the
model can generate a fad in which the number of optimistic agents rises for a while before
declining toward zero. To see how this pattern emerges, suppose that initially a large fraction
of the population is vulnerable and that ovv0 > sos0. In conjunction with equation (4), the
latter condition implies that the number of optimistic agents initially rises over time as the
number of vulnerable agents who become optimistic is larger than the number of optimistic
agents who become skeptical. The number of vulnerable agents declines over time as some of
these agents become optimistic and others become skeptical (see equation (6)). This decline
implies that, eventually, ovvt < sost. At this point, the fraction of optimistic agents begins
to fall. As t!1, all optimistic agents become skeptical (see equation (5)).
Case two In this case, the pdf of the optimistic agents has the lowest entropy:
eo < es < ev.
The fractions of optimistic, skeptical and vulnerable agents in the population evolve accord-
ing to:
ot+1 = ot + 
ovotvt + 
osotst, (7)
8See Du¢ e and Sun (2007) for a law of large numbers that applies to pairwise random meetings.
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st+1 = st + 
svstvt   osotst, (8)
vt+1 = vt   ovotvt   svstvt. (9)
To understand equation (7), note that the otvt encounters between optimistic and vul-
nerable agents lead ovotvt vulnerable agents to become optimistic. There are also otst
encounters between optimistic and skeptical, which lead osotst skeptical agents to become
optimistic. Equation (8) reects the fact that the otst encounters between skeptical and
optimistic agents result in osotst skeptical agents becoming optimistic. The stvt encounters
between skeptical and vulnerable agents result in svstvt vulnerable agents becoming skep-
tical. Finally, equation (9) implies that vt declines, since ovotvt vulnerable agents become
optimistic and svstvt become skeptical.
This version of the model also generates a fad but here, it is the number of skeptical
agents that rises for a while before declining toward zero. A fad arises when initially a large
fraction of the population is vulnerable and svvt > osot. The basic di¤erence between cases
one and two is that in the latter case skeptics are converted into optimists, so that eventually
all agents become optimistic.
Equilibrium in the frictionless model House prices are determined by the marginal
buyer. To identity this buyer, we sort agents in declining order of their house valuations.
The marginal buyer is the agent who is at the kth percentile of house valuations. When the
fraction of optimistic agents is lower than k for all t, the marginal home buyer is always a
non-optimistic agent. Since these agents do not expect changes in the utility of owning a
home, the price is constant over time at the value given by equation (2). In order to generate
a boom-bust cycle, at least k agents must be optimistic at some point in time.
It is useful to dene the time-t fundamental value of a house before the resolution of
uncertainty for a given agent, assuming that this agent is the marginal buyer until uncertainty
is resolved. We denote these fundamental values for the optimistic, skeptical, and vulnerable
agents by P ot , P
v
t , and P
s
t , respectively. The value of P
o
t is given by:
P ot = 



Eo(") + 
Eo(")
1  

+ (1  )("+ P ot+1)

. (10)
The logic that underlies this equation is as follows. With probability  uncertainty is resolved.
In this case, the expected utility ow and house price at time t+1 areEo(") and Eo(")=(1 
), respectively. With probability 1  , uncertainty is not resolved. In this case, the agent
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receives a utility ow, ", and values the house at P ot+1. Since we are deriving the fundamental
value under the assumption that the optimistic agent is always the marginal home buyer,
P ot = P
o
t+1 = P
o. Solving equation (10) for P o, we obtain:
P o = 
Eo(")=(1  ) + (1  )"
1  (1  ) . (11)
Vulnerable and skeptical agents expect " to equal ", so:
P s = P v =

1   ". (12)
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium of the economy in case one. Recall that in
this case, the fraction of optimistic agents rst rises and then falls. Suppose that the number
of optimistic agents is lower than k for t < t1 and exceeds k for t 2 [t1, t2], where t2 < 1.
For t > t2, the marginal home buyer is a skeptical agent, so the price is given by:
Pt = P
s; for t  t2 + 1. (13)
Using Pt2+1 as a terminal value we can compute recursively the prices for t  t2 that obtain
if uncertainty is not realized. Since the marginal home buyer between period t1 and period
t2 is an optimistic agent, we have:
Pt = f[Eo(" + P t+1)] + (1  )("+ Pt+1)g; for t1  t  t2.
Here, Pt+1 and P t+1 are the t+1 prices when uncertainty is not realized and when uncertainty
is realized, respectively.
Since the marginal home buyer for t < t1 is a vulnerable/skeptical agent, we have:
Pt = f[Es(" + P t+1)] + (1  )("+ Pt+1)g; for t < t1.
In writing this equation, we use the fact that: Es(") = Ev(").
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in case one.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price path in case one when uncertainty is not realized is
given by:
Pt =
8<:
P s + [(1  )]t1 t (Pt1   P s), t < t1,
P o   [(1  )]t2+1 t (P o   P s) , t1  t  t2,
P s, t > t2.
(14)
The equilibrium price path when uncertainty is realized is given by:
Pt =

1   "
. (15)
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The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Before time t1 the marginal buyer is a
vulnerable agent. If uncertainty is not realized, the marginal buyer at time t1 is an optimistic
agent. The latter agent is willing to buy the house at a value that exceeds P s because he
realizes a capital gain, Pt1   P s, with probability (1  )t1 t. The equilibrium price is equal
to P s plus the expected discounted capital gain, which is: [(1  )]t1 t (Pt1   P s) (see rst
line of equation (14)). The price jumps at time zero from P s to P s + [(1  )]t1 (Pt1   P s)
because of the expected capital gain associated with the change in the marginal buyer at
time t1. As long as uncertainty is not realized, the price rises before time t1 because the
expected discounted capital gain increases at the rate (1  ).
Between time t1 and t2 the marginal buyer is an optimistic agent. However, if uncertainty
is not realized, the marginal buyer at time t2 + 1 is a skeptical agent who is willing to buy
the house at a price P s < P o. So, the equilibrium price is equal to P o minus the expected
discounted capital loss, [(1  )]t2+1 t (P o   P s) (second line of equation (14)). As long
as uncertainty is not realized, the price falls before t2 + 1, because the expected discounted
capital loss rises at rate (1 ). After time t2+1 there are no more changes in the identity
of the marginal buyer. So, unless uncertainty is realized, the price remains constant and
equal to the fundamental value of a house to a skeptical agent, P s. Finally, once uncertainty
is realized, agents have homogeneous expectations about fundamentals and the price of a
house is given by equation (15).
Proposition 1 implies that the model generates a boom-bust cycle in house prices as long
as uncertainty is not realized. Of course, the model can also generate a boom-bust as well
as a protracted boom depending upon when uncertainty is realized and the realization of ".
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium in case two. Recall that, in this
case, the fraction of the population that is optimistic converges monotonically to one. We
dene t1 as the rst time period in which there are more optimistic agents than homes
(ot  k).
Proposition 2 The equilibrium price path in case two when uncertainty is not realized is
given by:
Pt =

P s + [(1  )]t1 t (P o   P s), t < t1,
P o, t  t1. (16)
The equilibrium price path when uncertainty is realized is given by:
Pt =

1   "
. (17)
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The intuition for this proposition is as follows. From time t1 until uncertainty is resolved,
the marginal home buyer is an optimistic agent. So, absent resolution of uncertainty, the price
is equal to P o for all t  t1. Before t1, the marginal home buyer is a vulnerable/skeptical
agent who has a fundamental house value P s. The equilibrium price is equal to P s plus
the discounted expected value of the capital gain that results from selling the house to an
optimistic agent at time t1, [(1  )]t1 t (P o   P s).
A simple numerical example We now consider a simple numerical example that illus-
trates the properties of the model summarized in the previous proposition.
We choose the normalization " = Ev(") = Es(") = 1. Given this choice, the equilibrium
depends on three additional features of agentspriors about future fundamentals: Eo("),
eo=ev and es=ev. In both case one and two we assume that:
Eo(") = 2:89.
In case one we assume that:
eo=ev = 0:894, es=ev = 0:890.
In case two we assume that:
eo=ev = 0:890, es=ev = 0:894.
We think of each time period as representing one month and choose  so that the implied
annual discount rate is six percent. We assume that there is a very small number of optimistic
and skeptical natural renters at time zero: o0 = s0 = 2:87  10 6. The remainder of the
population is vulnerable. We choose , the probability that uncertainty is realized in each
period, to equal 0:0038. Absent resolution of uncertainty, this value, together with our other
assumptions, implies that a boom-bust pattern emerges over the course of roughly 19 years.
Case one Our choices for eo=ev and es=ev imply:
so = 0:00475, ov = 0:106, and sv = 0:110.
Given these values, equations (5)(6) imply that the maximum value of ot is 0:345. So, the
presence of optimistic agents a¤ects prices only if k < 0:345. We assume that k = 0:275.
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Figure 1(a) shows the evolution of the fraction of skeptical, optimistic and vulnerable
agents absent resolution of uncertainty about ". Consistent with the intuition above, the
fraction of optimistic agents in the population initially increases slowly. The infection then
gathers momentum until the fraction of optimistic agents peaks at 0:345 in the middle of
year 12. Thereafter, this fraction declines toward zero. Between t1, the middle of year 11,
and t2, the end of year 19, the optimistic agents are the marginal buyers since they exceed
k = 0:275 in population. The fraction of vulnerable agents falls over time and converges to
zero as these agents become either skeptical or optimistic. The fraction of skeptical agents
rises monotonically over time until everybody in the economy is skeptical.
Consistent with Proposition 1, Figure 2 shows that the price jumps at time zero and then
continues to rise slowly until optimistic agents become the marginal home buyers at time t1.
Thereafter, the price drops rapidly, reverting to its initial steady-state value.
The one-period-ahead rate of return that agent j expects at time t, conditional on un-
certainty not having been realized, is given by:
rjt =
 [Ej (") + Ej (") =(1  )] + (1  )("+ Pt+1)
Pt
  1. (18)
Figure 2 displays rjt expressed on an annual basis. The gure also displays the volume of
transactions implied by the model computed under the assumption that trade only occurs
when at least one of the agents has a motive for transacting.
A key feature of Figure 2 is that agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the expected
rate of return to housing. This basic feature of our model is consistent with the ndings in
Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) who document this heterogeneity using the Michigan Survey
of Consumers.9
The annualized real rate of return to the marginal home owner is constant and equal
to six percent. Before t1, the skeptical/vulnerable agents are the marginal home owners.
Optimistic agents expect very high rates of return which reect the high value of Eo (").
So, all newly optimistic agents (ovotvt) buy homes.10 During this period, prices rise and
all transactions are initiated by agents who buy homes. Prices and transaction volume peak
simultaneously at time t1.
9Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) provides evidence of substantial heterogeneity of beliefs regarding the returns
to other assets, such as stocks.
10We assume that the vulnerable agents sell since they are indi¤erent between holding and selling. The
optimistic agents could induce them to sell by o¤erering an arbitrarially small premium. Some optimistic
agents become skeptical during this time period. However, for t  t1 optimistic agents who become skeptical
are indi¤erent between holding and selling, so we assume that they do not transact.
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Between time t1 and t2, the marginal buyer is an optimistic agent. During this period,
the skeptical/vulnerable agents expect negative rates of return because they have a low
expected value of ". So, all newly skeptical agents (sostot) sell their homes to optimistic
agents who are indi¤erent between buying and holding. During this period, prices fall and
all transactions are initiated by agents who sell homes. Figure 2 displays the time series
of transactions volume. Prices and transactions volume peak simultaneously at time t1.
Transaction volume collapses once prices start to fall because at this point optimistic agents
own all the houses. After time t1, the number of transactions recovers as some optimistic
agents become skeptical and sell their homes.
After time t2, the marginal home owner is, once again, a skeptical/vulnerable agent.
Optimistic agents expect very high rates of return that are not reected in market prices,
so all newly optimistic agents (ovotvt) buy homes. But, there are so few vulnerable agents
that the number of transactions is close to zero.
From Figure 2 we see that, while the identity of the marginal home owner changes
over time, the rate of return to the marginal owner is always six percent. Since pricing is
determined by the marginal owner, the expectations of infra-marginal agents are not reected
in home prices.
Finally, Figure 2 displays the price paths expected by optimistic and skeptical/vulnerable
agents at time zero. These paths are given by:
Ej0(Pt) = (1  )t+1 ("+ Pt+1) +

1  (1  )t+1 Ej (") + Ej (") =(1  ) , (19)
for j = o, s, v. Optimistic agents expect prices to rise very rapidly until time t1. Thereafter,
expected prices continue to rise but at a lower rate, reecting the fall in actual market prices
that occurs if uncertainty is not realized. This fall is outweighed by the high value of "
expected by optimistic agents. Finally, expected prices rise at a slightly higher rate after
time t2, because the price remains constant if uncertainty is not realized.
Consider next the price path expected by skeptical and vulnerable agents at time zero.
Equation (19) implies that:
Eo0(Pt)  Es0(Pt) =

1  (1  )t+1 Eo (")  Es (")
1   . (20)
So, the di¤erence between Eo0(Pt) and E
s
0(Pt) reects agentsdi¤erent expectations about
". This di¤erence implies that skeptical/vulnerable agents always expect a lower price
than optimistic agents. The skeptical/vulnerable agents expect prices to rise between time
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zero and time t1 because the price appreciation that occurs, as long as uncertainty is not
realized, outweighs the fall in price that occurs if uncertainty is realized. Between time t1 and
t2, skeptical/vulnerable agents expect prices to fall whether uncertainty is realized or not.
After time t2, the market price corresponds to the skeptical/vulnerable agents fundamental
price, so expected prices are constant.
Case two As in case one, we assume that k = 0:275. Our choices for eo=ev and es=ev
imply:
os = 0:00475, ov = 0:110, and sv = 0:106.
Figure 1(b) shows the evolution of the fraction of skeptical, optimistic, and vulnerable agents
absent resolution of uncertainty about ". The dynamics are the same as in Figure 1(a),
except that the skeptical and optimistic have switched places. Here there is a fad, in the
sense that the number of skeptical agents rises for roughly 12:5 years before falling to zero.
The fraction of optimistic agents rises monotonically over time until everyone is optimistic.
Consistent with Proposition 2, Figure 3 shows that the price jumps at time zero and then
continues to rise until the middle of year 10, when all homes are owned by optimistic agents.
From this moment on, the price is constant and equal to the optimistic agents fundamental
value.
Figure 3 also shows the volume of transactions implied by the model. At time zero, all
homes are owned by vulnerable agents. Between time zero and time t1, all newly optimistic
agents (ovotvt) buy homes. At time t1, all the homes are owned by optimistic agents and
there are no new transactions because optimistic agents do not become skeptical.
Finally, Figure 3 displays the price path expected by optimistic and skeptical/vulnerable
agents at time zero. This path is computed using equation (19). Optimistic agents expect
prices to rise very rapidly until t1. From this point on, the expected price continues to
increase because there is a rise over time in the probability that uncertainty is realized and
optimistic agents receive a large capital gain. Figure 3 also displays the price path expected
by skeptical and vulnerable agents at time zero. As in case one, the di¤erence between
Eo0(Pt) and E
s
0(Pt) is fully accounted for by di¤erent expectations about "
 (see equation
(20)).
Interpreting cross-sectional data on house prices A well-known property of housing
markets is the presence of both boom-bust episodes and episodes in which booms are not
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followed by busts. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) document this property using post-war data.
A longer perspective is provided by Ambrose, Eichholtz, Lindenthal (2013) who document
this property using four centuries of housing data for Holland. Eitrheim and Erlandsen
(2004) provide analogous evidence using two centuries of housing data for Norway.
It is useful to briey quantify some stylized facts about the post-war episodes. Our
results are based on quarterly OECD data on real house prices for 25 countries for the
period 1970 to 2012. An operational denition of a boom or a bust requires that we dene
turning points where upturns and downturns in house prices begin. To avoid dening high-
frequency movements in the data as upturns or downturns, we rst smooth the data. Let
yt denote the logarithm of an index of real house prices. Also let xt denote the centered-
moving average of yt; xt = 12n+1
Pn
j= n yt+j. We dene an upturn as an interval of time in
which xt > 0 for all t and a downturn as an interval of time in which xt < 0: A turning
point is the last time period within an upturn or downturn. A boom is an upturn for which
yT   yT L > z, and a bust is a downturn for which yT   yT L <  z. Here, T is the date
at which the boom or bust ended, L is the length of the boom or bust and z is a positive
scalar. The results discussed below are generated assuming that n = 5, so that xt is dened
as an 11-month centered moving average of yt. In addition, we assume that z = 0:15 so that
booms and busts are dened as price moments greater than or equal to 15 percent. Our
ndings are not sensitive to small changes in the assumed values of n and z.
Three key features emerge from our analysis. First, every country in the sample expe-
rienced house price booms and busts.11 The median sizes of booms and busts are 44:7 and
 28:5 percent, respectively. Second, booms and busts occur over protracted periods of time.
The median lengths of booms and busts in our sample are 5:5 and 5:38 years, respectively.
Third, in many cases booms are followed by protracted busts. We identied 62 booms and
38 busts in our sample. Of the 62 booms, 33 were followed within 6 months by a bust. So,
roughly half of the booms turned into a bust, while the other half did not.
Our frictionless model is consistent, at least qualitatively, with these three features of
the data. Regardless of whether we are in case one or case two, optimistic agents expect
prices to rise and eventually level o¤, while skeptical agents expect prices to rise and then
fall. An econometrician taking repeated samples from our data would see both boom-busts
and booms that are not followed by busts. The boom-bust episodes would typically occur in
11Australia and Austria only experienced booms, while Germany and Slovenia only experienced busts.
The data for Austria and Slovenia are available only since 2000 and 2007, respectively.
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economies where the skeptical agents happen to be correct. The booms that are not followed
by busts would typically occur in economies where the optimistic agents happen to be right.
Of course, in any given economy the econometrician cannot predict which type of episode
he would see because, by construction, the data are not informative about which agent is
correct.
Robustness In our analysis we assume that agents do not take into account the possibility
of changing their type as a result of social interactions. In Appendix A, we assess the
quantitative impact of this assumption by calculating equilibrium prices when agents do
internalize this possibility. We nd that internalizing these changes makes virtually no
di¤erence to our results because the probability of switching types is small. In Appendix B,
we discuss a second type of robustness. There, we describe a Bayesian environment which
generates social dynamics that are similar to those of our model.
3 A matching model
The frictionless model shows the potential of social dynamics to account for observed house-
price dynamics. However, this model has three unattractive features. First, to generate a
boom-bust cycle in case one, the fraction of agents that are optimistic must exceed k percent
of the population for at least some period of time. According to the Bureau of the Census, on
average, during the period 1965-2011, 65 percent of American households owned homes. So,
the model requires that a very large fraction of the population become optimistic.12 Second,
the price rise that occurs at time zero is large relative to the peak rise in prices. Third, the
model is too stylized to account for the fact that the volume of transactions and time to sell
are highly correlated with average house prices.
To address these shortcomings, we use an extended version of the matching model pro-
posed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2009). In this section, we consider a version of the model
in which agents have homogeneous expectations. The basic structure of this model coincides
with that of the frictionless model described in Section 2. The economy is populated by a
continuum of agents with unit measure. All agents have linear utility and discount utility at
12An alternative strategy for remedying this shortcoming is to allow for heterogeneity in the utility of
owning a home. For example, suppose there is a group of agents that would never sell their home because
they derive such a high utility from it. The presence of this group is equivalent to a reduction in k, so that
it is easier to generate a boom in the price of homes that are potentially for sale.
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the rate . There is a xed stock of houses, k < 1, and a rental market with 1   k houses.
Rental units are produced by competitive rms at a cost w per period, so the rental rate is
constant and equal to w.
There are four types of agents in the economy: home owners, unhappy home owners,
natural home buyers, and natural renters. We denote the fraction of these agents in the
population by ht, ut, bt, and rt, respectively. Home owners and unhappy home owners own
homes at time t. All homes are occupied in equilibrium so that:
ht + ut = k. (21)
Both natural buyers and natural renters rent homes at time t so that:
bt + rt = 1  k. (22)
We describe the state of the economy by zt = (ht; bt)0. We now discuss the problems faced
by the di¤erent agents in the economy.
Home owners A home owner derives momentary utility " from his home. The agents
value function, H(zt), is given by:
H(zt) = "+  [(1  )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1)] . (23)
With probability , a home owners match with his home goes sour and he becomes an
unhappy home owner. We denote the value function of an unhappy home owner by U(zt).
Unhappy home owners We normalize the momentary utility that an unhappy home
owner derives from his home to zero. This agent decides whether or not to put up his home
for sale. To simplify, we abstract from the transactions costs of selling a home. When a
house is up for sale, it sells with probability qs(zt). Once the sale occurs, the unhappy home
owner becomes a natural renter. The value function of an unhappy home owner is given by:
U(zt) = max[U
sell(zt); U
stay(zt)]. (24)
The value function of an unhappy home owner who puts his house up for sale is:
U sell(zt) = q
s(zt) fP (zt) +  [(1  )R(zt+1) + B(zt+1)]g+ [1  qs(zt)]U(zt+1). (25)
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Here, P (zt) denotes the price that an unhappy home owner expects to receive, conditional
on a sale, R(zt) denotes the value function of a natural renter and B(zt) denotes the value
function of a natural home buyer. The utility of a natural home buyer appears in equation
(25) because any agent who is a natural renter at the beginning of time t + 1 is, with
probability , subject to a preference shock that turns them into a natural buyer.
The value function of an unhappy home owner who decides to not put his house up for
sale is:
U stay(zt) = U(zt+1)   (zt). (26)
Here  (zt) denotes a non-pecuniary or regret cost paid by unhappy home owners who dont
put their house up for sale. We nd that our algorithm for solving the model is much more
stable if we scale the non-pecuniary cost by the expected revenue from selling the house
 (zt) =  q
s(zt)P (zt). In addition, this scale factor leads to a particularly simple expression
for the reservation price of an unhappy home owner:
P u(zt) =

1 +  
fU(zt+1)  [(1  )R(zt+1) + B(zt+1)]g . (27)
This reservation price makes the unhappy home owner indi¤erent between putting the house
on the market and not trying to sell it. As  goes to innity, the reservation price becomes
exogenous.
Natural home buyers A natural buyer is a renter at time t. He has to choose between
renting at t + 1 and trying to buy a home. His net ow utility from renting is given by
"   w and his value function is B(zt). If he decides to continue renting, his value function,
Brent(zt), is given by:
Brent(zt) = "  w + B(zt+1). (28)
If he tries to buy a house, he succeeds with probability qb(zt). In this case, he pays a price
P b(zt) and his continuation utility is that of a home owner ((1 )H(zt+1)+U(zt+1)). With
probability 1  qb(zt), he does not succeed in buying a house and he remains a renter at time
t+ 1. So the value function of being a potential buyer, Bbuy(zt), is given by:
Bbuy(zt) = "  w + qb(zt)
 P b(zt) +  [(1  )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1)]	
+

1  qb(zt)

B(zt+1). (29)
The value function of a natural home buyer is given by:
B(zt) = max[B
rent(zt); B
buy(zt)]. (30)
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The reservation price, P b(zt), is the price that makes a natural buyer indi¤erent between
buying and renting:
P b(zt) =  [(1  )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1) B(zt+1)] . (31)
Natural renters A natural renter is a renter at time t. His net ow utility from renting is
given by "  w and his value function is R(zt). The only di¤erence between natural renters
and natural buyers is that the former derive lower utility from owning a home. We model
this di¤erence by assuming that whenever natural renters buy a house they pay a xed cost,
". This xed cost represents the expected present value of the di¤erence between their
utility from owning a home and the corresponding utility of a natural buyer.13 We choose
the value of  so that it is not optimal for natural renters to buy a house in the steady state.
In each period, a fraction  of natural renters receive a preference shock and become
natural home buyers. A natural renter can choose whether to continue renting or to try to
buy a house. If he continues renting, his value function, Rrent(zt), is given by:
Rrent(zt) = "  w +  [(1  )R(zt+1) + B(zt+1)] . (32)
The continuation utility reects the fact that a natural renter becomes a natural home buyer
with probability .
If the natural renter tries to buy a house, he succeeds with probability qb(zt). In this
case, he pays a price P r(zt) and his continuation utility is the same as that of a home owner,
((1   )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1)), except that he must pay the xed cost ". With probability
1  qb(zt) the natural renter does not succeed in buying a house. In this case, he continues
to be a renter at time t + 1. The value function of a natural renter who decides to buy a
house, Rbuy(zt), is given by:
Rbuy(zt) = "  w + qb(zt) f P r(zt)  "+  [(1  )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1)]g
+

1  qb(zt)

 [(1  )R(zt+1) + B(zt+1)] . (33)
The value function of a natural renter is given by:
R(zt) = max[R
rent(zt); R
buy(zt)]. (34)
13Since the xed cost is paid upfront, all home owners are identical. It does not matter whether they used
to be a natural buyer or a natural renter. This property simplies our analysis by reducing the number of
di¤erent agents in the economy.
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The reservation price, P r(zt), is the price that makes natural renters indi¤erent between
buying and renting:
P r(zt) =  f[(1  )H(zt+1) + U(zt+1)]  [(1  )R(zt+1) + B(zt+1)]g   ". (35)
It is useful to dene a set of indicator functions summaring the optimal strategy of
di¤erent types of agents. The indicator function J b(zt) is equal to one if it is optimal for
a natural buyer to buy a house when the state of the economy is zt and is equal to zero
otherwise. The indicator function Jr(zt) is equal to one if it is optimal for a natural renter
to buy a house when the state of the economy is zt and is equal to zero otherwise. The
indicator function Ju(zt) is equal to one if it is optimal for an unhappy home owner to put
up his house for sale when the state of the economy is zt and is equal to zero otherwise.
Timing The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period,
the state variable is zt. Then, preference shocks occur. With probability , home owners
become unhappy home owners. With probability , natural renters become natural buyers.
Then agents make decisions.14 Transactions occur at the end of the period. A fraction
qs(zt)J
u(zt) of unhappy home owners sell their homes while a fraction qb(zt)J b(zt) of home
buyers buy houses.
The laws of motion for the fraction of home owners, unhappy home owners, natural home
buyers and natural renters in the population are given by:
ht+1 = (1  )ht + qb(zt)

(bt + rt) J
b(zt) + rt(1  )Jr(zt)

, (36)
ut+1 = (ut + ht) [1  qs(zt)Ju(zt)] , (37)
bt+1 = (bt + rt) [1  qb(zt)J b(zt)], (38)
rt+1 = (1  )rt[1  qb(zt)Jr(zt)] + qs(zt)Ju(zt) (ut + ht) . (39)
These equations along with equations (21) and (22) dene a law of motion for the state
vector, zt, that we denote zt+1 = G(zt).
The matching technology Since agents can only own one home, only natural renters and
natural buyers can potentially buy homes. The total number of potential buyers is given by:
Buyers(zt) = (bt + rt) J b(zt) + rt(1  )Jr(zt). (40)
14Given our notation, value functions are evaluated at this point in time.
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There is no short selling and home owners only sell when the match with their home goes
sour. The total number of potential sellers is given by:
Sellers(zt) = (ut + ht) Ju(zt). (41)
There is a technology that governs matches between buyers and sellers. When a match
occurs, the transactions price is determined by generalized Nash bargaining. The bargaining
power of sellers and buyers is  and 1  , respectively. Matches can occur between a seller
and a natural buyer or a natural renter. In the rst case, the price paid by the natural buyer,
P b(zt), is:
P b(zt) =  P
b(zt) + (1  ) P u(zt). (42)
In the second case, the price paid by the natural renter, P r(zt), is:
P r(zt) =  P
r(zt) + (1  ) P u(zt). (43)
The average price received by an unhappy home owner, P (zt), is given by:
P (zt) =
(bt + rt) J
b(zt)P
b(zt) + rt(1  )Jr(zt)P r(zt)
(bt + rt) J b(zt) + rt(1  )Jr(zt) . (44)
The number of homes sold, m(zt), is determined by the matching function:
m(zt) = Sellers(zt)Buyers(zt)1 . (45)
The probabilities of selling, qs(zt), and buying, qb(zt), a house are given by:
qs(zt) = m(zt)=Sellers(zt), (46)
qb(zt) = m(zt)=Buyers(zt). (47)
3.1 Solution Algorithm
In this subsection we discuss our algorithm for solving the model. We begin by describing
the steady state and then show how to solve the equilibrium of the model, given arbitrary
initial conditions.
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Steady State It can be shown that the model economy has a unique steady state in which
the fraction of the di¤erent types of agents is constant. We now solve for the steady-state
values of the probabilities of buying and selling a home (qb and qs) and the fraction of the
di¤erent agents in the population (h, u, b, and r).
We choose a value for  so that the probabilities of buying and selling a house coincide
in the steady state:
qs = qb.
Equations (45) and(46) imply that qs = qb = . This property, together with equations (22)
and (38), implies that the steady-state number of natural buyers is given by:
b =
(1  )(1  k)
+ (1  ) .
Given b, we solve for r, u, and h, as functions of ,  and k using equations (22), (37) and
(21).
The fact that qs = qb implies that the number of buyers is equal to the number of sellers
(equations (46) and (47)). Since there are u + h unhappy home owners and b + r buyers
in steady state, we set  so that:
u+ h = b+ r.
Given the values of qs and qb, we can solve for the steady-state values of the prices, P ,
P b, and P r, the reservation prices of unhappy home owners, natural renters and sellers, P u,
P r, and P s, and the value functions of the di¤erent agents evaluated in the steady state: H,
U , B and R. To do so, we use the steady state versions of equations (23)(35), (42)(44)
and the fact that, in steady state, B = Bbuy and R = Rrent.
Transitional Dynamics We assume that at time T = 2000 the system has converged
to the steady state. Consequently, we obtain an approximate solution because it takes an
innite number of periods for the model economy to converge to the steady state.
Let the set Z denote all the values of the state variable zt that occur along the transition
path. First, guess that J b(zt) = Ju(zt) = 1 and Jr(zt) = 0 for all zt 2 Z. Second, using
the initial conditions z0 = (h0; b0) and equations (36)-(39), compute the sequence of values
of ht, ut, bt, and rt. Third, use equations (40), (41), (45)(47) to compute the values of
qs(zt) and qb(zt) for zt 2 Z. Fourth, assume that: H(zT ) = H, U(zT ) = U , B(zT ) = B, and
R(zT ) = R. Then use equations (23) to (35) and (44) to solve backwards for fH(zt), U(zt),
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B(zt), R(zt); P (zt)g for t = 1 to T . Finally, verify whether the guesses for J b(zt); Jr(zt),
and Ju(zt) for zt 2 Z describe the optimal behavior of buyers and sellers along the proposed
transition path. If not, revise the guesses for J b(zt); Jr(zt), and Ju(zt) until a consistent
solution is obtained.
3.2 Experiments
We illustrate the properties of the model through a series of experiments.
An expected improvement in fundamentals We rst consider the same experiment
that we study in the frictionless model assuming that agents have homogeneous beliefs. At
time zero, agents suddenly anticipate that, with probability , the utility of owning a home
rises from " to " > ". It is easy to show that there are no transition dynamics and the
economy converges immediately to a new steady state with a higher price. So, when beliefs
are homogeneous, anticipated future changes in fundamentals are immediately reected in
todays price. Matching frictions per se do not produce interesting price dynamics, at least
in the experiment studied here.
Transitional dynamics We now study an experiment that highlights how an exogenous
increase in the number of buyers a¤ects home prices. The resulting intuition is useful for
understanding the e¤ects of social dynamics that we discuss in the next section. Suppose that
the fraction of natural buyers in the population is initially higher than its steady state value,
b0 > b. Since r0 = 1 k b0, the fraction of natural renters in the population is initially lower
than its steady state value. The time-zero value of the state variable is z0 = (b0; h0), where
h0 is equal to the steady state value of h. Equations (45)(47) imply that the probability of
buying a house at time zero is lower than in the steady state: qb(z0) < qb(z). The time-zero
probability of selling is higher than it is in steady state: qs(z0) > qs(z).
We illustrate the transition dynamics of the model using the parameter values summa-
rized in Table 1. These values are discussed in detail in Section 4, where we consider the
quantitative properties of our model.
Figure 4 depicts the models transition dynamics assuming that the time-zero number of
natural buyers is roughly double its steady-state level. We now discuss the intuition for why
the price is initially high and converges to the steady state from above. Along the transition
path, only natural buyers want to buy houses, so the transactions price is a weighted average
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of the reservation prices of the natural buyers and the unhappy home owners:
P (zt) =  P
b(zt) + (1  ) P u(zt). (48)
Consider rst the determinants of P u(zt). From equation (27), P u(zt) is increasing in
U(zt+1) and decreasing in B(zt+1) and R(zt+1). The utility of an unhappy home owner,
U(zt+1), converges to the steady state from above, a result that reects two forces. First,
because the number of buyers is high during the transition, the probability of selling is higher
than in the steady state. Second, the price received by the seller is higher than in the steady
state. Next, consider the determinants of R(zt+1). Along the transition path, it is optimal for
natural renters to rent. But, with probability , they may become natural buyers. Equation
(32) implies that R(zt+1) is an increasing function of the discounted expected present value
of B(zt+2). Since B(zt+1) is low when there is a large number of buyers, so is R(zt+1).
Given that U(zt+1) is high and B(zt+1) and R(zt+1) are low relative to the steady state, the
reservation price of an unhappy home owner, P u(zt), is high.
Consider second the determinants of P b(zt). When a new buyer moves into a new home,
with probability  he becomes immediately disenchanted and puts the home up for sale.
So, the reservation price of a natural buyer is an increasing function of H(zt+1) and U(zt+1)
(see equation (31)). Since the opportunity cost to a natural buyer of being a home owner is
B(zt+1), his reservation price is a decreasing function of B(zt+1). When the number of buyers
is high relative to the steady state, unhappy home owners can sell their home more quickly
and receive a higher price. This property has three implications. First, the value of being an
unhappy of owner, U(zt+1), is higher than in the steady state. Second, H(zt+1) is also higher
than in the steady state. This result reects that all home owners will eventually become
disenchanted and sell their homes. Equation (23) implies that H(zt+1) is an increasing
function of the discounted expected present value of U(zt+2), which is high when the number
of buyers is unusually high. Third, given our calibration, the value of being a natural buyer,
B(zt+1) falls, reecting the di¢ culty in buying a house when there are many buyers. All
three forces lead to a rise in P b(zt).
Recall that P (zt) is a weighted average of the reservation prices of the unhappy home
owners and the natural buyers (see equation (48)). Since both of these prices rise, so too
does P (zt).
In summary, in this experiment an increase in the initial number of buyers reduces the
probability of buying a house and raises the probability of selling a house. In addition, it
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lowers the utility of buyers, raises the utility of sellers, and generates prices that are above
their steady state values.
These results suggest that a boom-bust episode occurs if, for some reason, there is a
persistent increase in the number of buyers followed by a persistent decrease. In the next
section we show that social dynamics can generate the required movements in the number
of buyers without observable movements in fundamentals.
4 A matching model with social dynamics
In this section we consider an economy that incorporates the social dynamics described in
Section 2 into the model with matching frictions described in Section 3. We use this model
to study the same basic experiment considered in Section 2. Suppose that before time zero
the economy is in a steady state with no uncertainty. At time zero, agents learn that, with
a small probability , the value of " changes permanently to a new level ". Agents agree
about the value of  but disagree about the probability distribution for ". Agents dont
receive any information that is useful for updating their priors about the distribution of ".
Once uncertainty is resolved agents become homogeneous in their beliefs. At that point, the
economy coincides with the one studied in the previous section where the utility of owning
a home is ". The economy then converges to a steady state from initial conditions that are
determined by social dynamics and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
Agentsexpectations about " depend on whether they are optimistic, skeptical or vul-
nerable. In addition, agents can be home owners, unhappy home owners, natural buyers, or
natural renters. So, there are twelve di¤erent types of agents in the economy. We use the
variables hjt , u
j
t , b
j
t , and r
j
t to denote the fraction of the population of type j agents who are
home owners, unhappy home owners, natural home buyers, and natural renters, respectively.
The index j denotes whether the agent is optimistic, skeptical or vulnerable: j 2 fo; s; vg.
As in Section 3, agents are subject to preference shocks which can turn natural renters
into natural buyers and home owners into unhappy home owners. The timing of events
within a period is as follows. First, uncertainty about " is realized or not. Second, prefer-
ence shocks occur. With probability , home owners become unhappy home owners. With
probability , natural renters become natural buyers. Third, social interactions occur and
agents potentially change their views. Fourth, transactions occur.
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4.1 Setting up the model
4.1.1 Population dynamics
There are three ways to incorporate social dynamics into the matching model. The rst is
closest in spirit to Section 3. Here, agents meet in the beginning of the period via random
matching at which point social dynamics occur. With this timing, social dynamics impact
directly the number of buyers and sellers in the housing market by changing the fraction
of agents of di¤erent types. The second approach assumes that social interactions occur
only when agents transact in the housing market. Under this assumption, transactions drive
social dynamics which later on drive further transactions. The third approach assumes that
social dynamics occur at the beginning of the period as well as during market transactions.
We choose the rst rather than the second approach because it highlights the role of social
dynamics in generating transactions. We choose the rst rather than the third approach
because it is much simpler and it provides a parsimonious way of generating a gradual
increase in the number of optimistic agents (see Section 2).
To solve the model, we must keep track of the fraction of the di¤erent types of agents in
the model. Prior to the resolution of uncertainty the number of home owners adds up to k
and the number of renters to 1  k, so we can summarize the state of the economy using a
vector of ten state variables:
zt = (ht; bt; h
v
t ; h
s
t ; b
v
t ; b
s
t ; r
v
t ; r
s
t ; u
v
t ; u
s
t)
0.
To streamline our exposition, we discuss here only the law of motion for the fraction of
natural renters who are vulnerable. In the appendix we describe the population dynamics for
the other agents, which are similar. We denote the fraction of vulnerable natural renters at
the beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and
after purchases and sales occur, by rvt , (r
v
t )
0, (rvt )
00, and rvt+1, respectively. At the beginning
of the period, a fraction  of the natural renters become natural buyers,
(rvt )
0 = rvt (1  ).
Next, social interactions occur. A fraction svst of the vulnerable natural renters become
skeptical and a fraction ovot become optimistic. Consequently, the fraction of vulnerable
natural renters after social interactions is given by:
(rvt )
00 = (rvt )
0   sv (rvt )0 st   ov (rvt )0 ot.
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Transactions occur at the end of the period. Let (uvt )
00 denote the fraction of the vulnera-
ble natural sellers that remain after social interactions occur. Let Ju;v(zt) denote an indicator
function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a vulnerable unhappy home owner to put
his house up for sale when the state of the economy at the beginning of the period was zt
and zero otherwise. If these agents put their homes up for sale, a fraction qs(zt) succeeds in
selling. So, the total number of successful sellers is qs(zt)Ju;v(zt) (uvt )
00. These sellers become
natural renters. Let Jr;v(zt) denote an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal
for a vulnerable natural renter to buy a home when the state of the economy is zt and zero
otherwise. The number of vulnerable natural renters who try to purchase a home is equal
to Jr;v(zt) (rvt )
00. A fraction qb(zt) of these agents succeed and become natural home owners.
So, the number of vulnerable natural renters at the beginning of time t+ 1 is given by:
rvt+1 = (r
v
t )
00   qb(zt)Jr;v(zt) (rvt )00 + qs(zt)Ju;v(zt) (uvt )00 .
Using a similar approach for the other population fractions, we can describe the law of
motion of zt as zt+1 = G(zt) where G is a function determined by the deterministic dynamics
of the populations of di¤erent types.
After uncertainty is realized, of course, agents have homogenous beliefs and population
dynamics are described by the same processes given in Section 3.
We now describe the value functions of the di¤erent agents in the economy. We begin
by displaying the value functions that are relevant after " is realized. We then discuss the
value functions that are relevant before " is realized.
4.1.2 Value functions and price functions after realization of uncertainty
The value functions of the di¤erent agents and all the price functions are the same as those
dened in Section 3 with one di¤erence. The momentary utility, ", is replaced in value by "
when uncertainty is realized. Here, it is useful to explicitly index the value functions H, U ,
B and R, and the price functions, P , P b, P r, P u, P b and P r by ". For example, we dene
the value function of the home owner as:
H(zt; "
) = " +  [(1  )H(zt+1; ") + U(zt+1; ")] .
Similarly, the equations we used in Section 3 to dene U , B and R, and the price functions,
P , P b, P r, P u, P b and P r only need to be modied by replacing " with ". These functions
apply after the resolution of uncertainty because, once uncertainty is resolved, there is no
distinction between skeptical, optimistic, and vulnerable agents.
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4.1.3 Value functions before the realization of uncertainty
We can write zt = zt where  = ( I2 028 ). In order to solve the model, we need to
compute value and price functions for the period before uncertainty is realized. Let Hj(zt),
U j(zt), Bj(zt), and Rj(zt) denote the value functions before uncertainty is realized of a type
j home owner, unhappy homeowner, natural buyer and natural renter, respectively. Also
dene type js time t expectation of a generic value function at time t+ 1:
Vje (zt)  (1  )Vj[G(zt)] + 
X
"2
f j(")V [G(zt); "] . (49)
Here V represents H, U , B, or R, V represents, correspondingly, H, U , B or R, G(zt) is the
vector of end-of-period t populations and G(zt) represents the relevant subset of the these
variables if uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of period t+ 1.
Given this notation, prior to the resolution of uncertainty the Bellman equation for a
homeowner is
Hj(zt) = "+ 

(1  )Hje(zt) + U je (zt)

; (50)
The Bellman equation for a type j unhappy homeowner is
U j(zt) = max[U sell;j(zt);U stay;j(zt)];
with
U sell;j(zt) = qs(zt)fPj(zt) + 

(1  )Rje(zt) + Bje(zt)
g+ [1  qs(zt)]U je (zt),
U stay;j(zt) = U je (zt)   qs(zt)Pj(zt).
Here Pj(zt) denotes the average selling price for type j conditional on a sale, and qs(zt) is
the probability of a sale. The reservation price of a type j unhappy homeowner is:
Pu;j(zt) = 
1 +  
U je (zt)  (1  )Rje(zt) + Bje(zt)	 .
The Bellman equation for a type j natural buyer, Bj(zt), is given by:
Bj(zt) = max[Brent;j(zt);Bbuy;j(zt)].
with
Brent;j(zt) = "  w + Bje(zt),
Bbuy;j(zt) = "  w + qb(zt)f Pb;j(zt) + [(1  )Hje(zt) + U je (zt)]g
+[1  qb(zt)]Bje(zt). (51)
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Here Pb;j(zt) denotes the average buying price for a type j natural buyer, and qb(zt) is the
probability of a purchase. The reservation price of a type j natural buyer is:
Pb;j(zt) = [(1  )Hje(zt) + U je (zt)  Bje(zt)]. (52)
The Bellman equation for a type j natural renter, Rj(zt), is given by:
Rj(zt) = max[Rrent;j(zt);Rbuy;j(zt)].
with
Rrent;j(zt) = "  w + 

(1  )Rje(zt) + Bje(zt)

,
Rbuy;j(zt) = "  w + qb(zt)f Pr;j(zt)  "+ [(1  )Hje(zt) + U je (zt)]g
+[1  qb(zt)]

(1  )Rje(zt) + Bje(zt)

. (53)
Here Pr;j(zt) denotes the average buying price for a type j natural renter. The reservation
price of a type j natural renter is:
Pr;j(zt) = 

(1  )Hje(zt) + U je (zt)  (1  )Rje(zt)  Bje(zt)
  ". (54)
4.1.4 Buyers and sellers
In a slight abuse of notation (since the state variable is now zt), the number of buyers and
sellers is given by:
Buyers(zt) =
X
j=o;s;v
(bjt)
00J b;j(zt) +
X
j=o;s;v
(rjt )
00Jr;j(zt), (55)
Sellers(zt) =
X
j=o;s;v
(ujt)
00Ju;j(zt). (56)
Here J b;j(zt) [Jr;j(zt)] is an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a type j
natural buyer [renter] to buy a home when the state of the economy is zt and zero otherwise.
Similarly, Ju;j(zt) is an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a type j
unhappy home owner to put his house up for sale when the state of the economy is zt and
zero otherwise.
The number of homes sold, and the probabilities of buying and selling are given by
suitably modied versions of equations (45), (46) and (47).
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4.1.5 Transactions prices
There are eighteen di¤erent possible transaction prices arising out of potential transactions
between three types of sellers, three types of natural buyers, and three types of natural
renters. The average price paid by a type j natural buyer is:
Pb;j(zt) =  Pb;j(zt) + (1  )
X
`=o;s;v
(u`t)
00Ju;`(zt)
Sellers(zt)
Pu;`(zt). (57)
The average price paid by a type j natural renter is:
Pr;j(zt) =  Pr;j(zt) + (1  )
X
`=o;s;v
(u`t)
00Ju;`(zt)
Sellers(zt)
Pu;`(zt). (58)
The average price received by a type j seller is given by:
Pj(zt) = 
X
`=o;s;v

(b`t)
00J b;`(zt) Pb;`(zt) + (r`t)00Jr;`(zt) Pr;`(zt)

Buyers(zt)
+ (1  ) Pu;j(zt). (59)
The average price across all transactions can be obtained by averaging across the seller types:
P(zt) =
X
`=o;s;v
(u`t)
00Ju;`(zt)
Sellers(zt)
P`(zt). (60)
4.2 Solving the model
In this subsection, we describe a solution algorithm to compute the equilibrium of the econ-
omy along a path on which uncertainty has not been realized.
We begin by considering case one. In this case, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents
eventually become skeptical. Since Es(") = ", if the path under consideration converges
then it converges to the initial steady state of the economy.
We use the algorithm described in Section 3 to solve for the steady state associated with
all possible realizations of " and for the values of the value functions along the transition
to the steady state for any initial condition zt and realized value of ": H(zt; "), U(zt; "),
B(zt; "
), and R(zt; "). As in Section 3, we denote by Z the set of the values of the state
variable zt that occur along the equilibrium path. We denote by Z the set of the values of
the state variable zt that occur along the equilibrium path.
Our solution algorithm is as follows. First, we specify the initial conditions in the econ-
omy: hj0, u
j
0, b
j
0, and r
j
0 for j = o; s; v. We choose these conditions so that the fractions of
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home owners, unhappy home owners, natural buyers, and natural renters are equal to their
initial steady state values. In addition, we assume that all agents are vulnerable except for a
small number, , of optimistic and skeptical renters: hv0 = h and b
v
0 = b, u
v
0 = u, r
o
0 = r
s
0 = ,
and rv0 = 1  k   b  2.
Second, we guess values of the indicator functions that summarize the optimal decisions
of natural buyers, natural renters, and unhappy home owners J b;j(zt), Jr;j(zt), and Ju;j(zt)
for all zt 2 Z.
Third, we use equations (62)-(81) in Appendix C to compute the path of zt and the
analogs of equations (45)(47), as well as equations (55) and (56), to compute the values of
qs(zt) and qb(zt) for zt 2 Z.
Fourth, we compute the limiting values of the value functions of all agents along the path
on which uncertainty is not realized. The system of equations that denes these limiting
values is given by equations (83)(95) in Appendix C.
Fifth, we solve backwards for all the value functions using equations (50)(54) and (57)
(60). As in Section 3, we assume that the economy has reached its steady state at time
T = 2000.
Sixth, we verify that the initial guesses for the indicator functions J b;j(zt), Jr;j(zt), and
Ju;j(zt) describe the optimal behavior of buyers and sellers along the proposed equilibrium
path. If not, we revise the guesses until we obtain a consistent solution. In all the results that
we report, the equilibrium values of the indicator functions are: J b;j(zt) = 1 and Ju;j(zt) = 1
for all j, Jr;o(zt) = 1; Jr;s(zt) = Jr;v(zt) = 0 for all zt 2 Z.
We use a similar algorithm to solve for the equilibrium in case two. An important
di¤erence between cases one and two is that, in case two, absent resolution of uncertainty,
all agents become optimistic. Given our conjectures about the optimal decisions of the agents,
this means the economy does not converge to a steady state equivalent to an economy in
which " = Eo("). This is because in the latter economy natural renters choose to rent,
whereas here, in the limit, all natural renters are optimistic and choose to buy. We provide
the detailed solution method for case two in Appendix C.
5 Model calibration
In this section we discuss our procedure for calibrating the model. In solving the model
each period is one month long. We choose one set of parameters so that the steady state of
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the model is consistent with the long-run properties of the U.S. housing market. We choose
a second set of parameters, which controls the distribution of beliefs and their dynamics,
to match micro evidence on agents expectations about future house prices and the self-
perceived values of their homes during the recent boom-bust episode. Here, we bring to bear
new evidence on the evolution of di¤erent agentsexpectations of home values. Using the
Case and Shiller (2010) survey of homeowner expectations and the American Housing Survey,
we document that, during the boom episode, there was a sharp increase in the di¤erence
between the mean and the median of expected appreciation in house prices and self-assessed
home values across agents.
According to the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, house prices in-
creased from 1994 to 2006 and declined from 2006 to 2012. The value of the ination-adjusted
house price index in 2012 is about the same as in 1994. In light of this observation, we in-
terpret the recent boom-bust episode in the U.S. as one in which skeptical and vulnerable
agents never changed their views about fundamentals (i.e. Es(") = Ev(") = ") and, ex
post, skeptical agents were correct.
In what follows, we want to be agnostic about whether or not the boom ended because
uncertainty about future fundamentals was realized. For this reason, we use the quantitative
implications of the model in case one to guide our calibration. Recall that in this case, a
boom-bust pattern occurs both when uncertainty is not realized and when uncertainty is
realized and the skeptical agents are correct.15 In evaluating the model, we think of the U.S.
episode as a draw from the skeptical agents unconditional distribution about future housing
fundamentals.
Parameters calibrated using steady-state properties of the model We rst describe
a set of parameters chosen to render the steady state of the model consistent with selected
rst moments of the data. We set the stock of houses, k, to 0:65. Recall that this value is the
average fraction of home owners in the U.S. population. We choose , the scale parameter in
the matching function, so that the average time to sell a house is approximately six months.
This number is roughly equal to the average time that it takes to sell an existing home,
computed using data from the National Association of Realtors for the period 1999 to 2012.
It is also consistent with the calibration in Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), which is based on
15In case two, a permanent boom occurs when uncertainty is not realized or when the optimistic agents
are correct. A boom-bust pattern occurs only when uncertainty is realized and the skeptical are correct.
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data from the American Housing Survey. We choose  so that the probabilities of buying
and selling coincide in the steady state. We choose  so that, in conjunction with our other
assumptions, households sell their homes on average every 15 years. This value is close to
the one used in Piazzesi and Schneider (2009). We set both the matching parameter () and
the bargaining parameter () to 0:5, so as to treat buyers and sellers symmetrically.
It is di¢ cult to obtain direct evidence on the parameter . In our benchmark calibration
we assume that  is equal to 62. This value implies that the steady state utility of a
natural renter who buys a home is 32 percent lower than that of a natural home buyer. In
conjunction with our other assumptions, this value of  implies that it is not optimal for
natural renters to buy homes in the steady state. We nd that our results are robust to
reasonable perturbations in . We choose  to be consistent with an annual discount factor
of 6 percent. In addition, we normalize " to one and "  w to zero.
Parameters governing expectations and social dynamics We calibrate the six pa-
rameters Eo("), ,  , es=ev; eo=ev, and  to match an equally-weighted system of nine
features of the data. This procedure is analogous to an over-identied version of GMM with
an identity weighting matrix.
Our quantitative analysis focuses on the three cities for which Case and Shiller (2010)
report expectations data: Boston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.16 We assume that the
recent U.S. boom-bust episode began in March 1996 when the average real home price in
our three cities was at its lowest value in the 1990s. We assume that the episode ended
in October 2006, the rst month after which there is a sustained, uninterrupted fall in real
housing prices for our three cities.17 We focus on the years 2003, 2005 and 2006, the years
during the episode for which we have expectations data (there are no data for 2004).18
The rst feature of the data that we use in our calibration procedure is the one-year
expected real appreciation. The three observations are reported in Table 2.19
The next feature of the data that we use is the di¤erence between the mean and the
16The survey also includes results for Milwaukee. We exclude these results because Milwaukee is not
included in the S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index.
17By sustained, we mean one quarter or longer in duration.
18In an updated version of their paper, Case, Shiller and Thompson (2012) provide summary statistics for
additional survey years in Alameda County (CA), Boston, Milwaukee and Orange County (CA).
19These statistics are based on the average forecasts as reported by Case and Shiller (2010), Table 6. We
use the U.S. survey of professional forecasters to convert expected nominal appreciation into expected real
appreciation.
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median of the one-year expected increase in home prices. Again, we have three observations,
reported in Table 2. To motivate why these statistics are of interest, recall that a central
prediction of our model is that, because of social dynamics, a boom in house prices is
associated with an increase in the fraction of optimistic agents. This increase generally
implies a rise in the di¤erence between the mean and the median expected home price
appreciation over the following year. Recall that the fraction of optimistic agents is very
small at the start of the boom and rises over time before eventually declining. However,
the fraction of optimistic agents never exceeds 50 percent, so the median agent is always
a vulnerable or a pessimistic agent. As the fraction of optimistic agents rises, the mean
across agents of the expected rate of home-price appreciation also rises. Taken together,
these observations imply that the di¤erence between the mean and the median expected
appreciation rises in the boom phase of the cycle.
Interestingly, a widening gap between mean and median values also shows up in agents
views of what their homes are worth. In the biannual American Housing Survey (AHS), the
Bureau of the Census asks homeowners the following question: How much do you think
your house would sell for on todays market? Our analysis focuses, again, on homes in
Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco. We compute the percentage di¤erence between the
mean and the median valuation for each city at each point in time for the 19972009 period.
This statistic is roughly zero in 1997 and remains close to zero until around 2000. Table 2
reports the average of this statistic across the three cities. We use the observations for 2003,
2005 and 2006 in our calibration exercise.
Computing model moments To compute the analogue to the rst three statistics dis-
cussed above (expected house-price appreciation), we proceed as follows. First, we compute
the one-year ahead expected appreciation for optimistic, skeptical and vulnerable homeown-
ers. We then compute the weighted average of these expectations. We also compute, as an
anologue to the second group of three statistics, the mean minus median expectations of
house price appreciation across homeowners.
A key issue is how to map the AHS question (relevant for the last three statistics) into
our model. One possibility is that agents report the average price paid for a house at time
t. All agents in the model know current market prices. So, under this interpretation there
should be no dispersion in response to the AHS question and the mean and the median
response should coincide. This implication is clearly inconsistent with Table 2. We infer
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that this interpretation of the question is implausible from the perspective of our model.
It is possible that the di¤erence between the mean and median response reects systematic
changes in the market value of idiosyncratic house characteristics during the boom episode.
This interpretation strikes us as implausible because the mean minus the median is close to
zero in 1997 and then rises dramatically.
In what follows, we suppose that agents respond to the AHS question by reporting the
value that they attach to their home. In our model, the mean value is a weighted average of
Hje(zt) and U je (zt), where the weights are the fractions of happy and unhappy home owners
of each type j = o; v; s. Current market prices have a direct e¤ect on U je (zt) since the agent
is trying to sell the house. Market prices a¤ect Hje(zt) because happy home owners might
become home sellers in the future. The American Housing Survey does not distinguish
whether survey respondents currently have their home on the market or not. So, we do not
make this distinction when we compute the mean and median values implied by our model.
Calibrated parameters Table 1 reports the calibrated parameter values. Two key fea-
tures are worth noting. First, the percent of the population that are optimistic at time zero
is very small, so a boom-bust episode is triggered by a small number of agents. Second, the
entropy ratio eo=ev is slightly larger than es=ev. Other things equal, this small di¤erence
enables the model to generate a gradual boom-bust pattern, even in the absence of resolution
of uncertainty.
6 Quantitative properties of the model
In this section we discuss the quantitative properties of our model. The rst subsection
reports the models implications for various moments of the data, including those used in
the overidentied calibration procedure. In the second subsection we discuss the house price
dynamics implied by cases one and two. Finally, we compute and analyze the unconditional
expected price paths for the di¤erent agents in our economy.
6.1 Implications for data moments
Table 2 reports the models implications for various moments of the data. A number of key
results emerge with respect to the moments targeted by the calibration procedure. First, the
model captures the fact that agents expected substantial appreciation in housing prices in the
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period 2003-06. Our model somewhat overstates the average expected appreciation which is
7:2 percent in our model and 5:6 percent in the data. Second, the model is also consistent
with average mean minus median expected rate of home-price appreciation over the boom
years of the episode. The average value of this statistic over the period 2003-06 is 1:9 percent
in the model and 1:5 percent in the data. Third, the model does well at accounting for the
di¤erence between the self-assessed mean minus median home values reported in the AHS
for the 2003-06 period. The average value of this statistic is 18 percent in both the data and
the model.
We now turn to four features that are not targeted by the calibration procedure. First,
consider the AHS-based statistics reported in Table 2. Notice that in the data the self-
assessed mean minus median home value is equal to zero in 1997 and then peaks at 20
percent near the end of the episode. The model succeeds at capturing the magnitude of
the rise and the shape of the rise, even though the pre-2003 values were not part of our
calibration procedure. This success clearly reects the presence of heterogenous expectations
and social dynamics. Second, the model does extremely well at accounting for the rise in
house prices in the beginning of the episode. A key feature of the data is that housing
prices rise very slowly in the initial phases of the boom-bust episode. For example, the
Case-Shiller index for the three cities rose by 1.3 percent from March 1996 (the trough)
to March 1997. In our model, house prices do not jump in the beginning of the episode.
Rather, they slowly start to rise. We view this property as an important success because in
standard rational expectations models asset prices move substantially on impact in response
to news about future fundamentals. Third, the length of the boom-episode is 10:6 years in
the data. According to the model, the time at which the expected price is maximized is 13:1
years from the beginning of the episode. So, our model does reasonably well at generating
the prolonged nature of the observed boom-bust episode. Finally, the mean value of the
maximum percentage rise in house prices implied by the model is 289 percent. In the data
this rise is 144 percent. So, judging by these statistics alone, the model over-estimates the
magnitude of the boom. We can use the model to compute the probability distribution of the
maximum rise in prices. We nd that a 144 percent boom lies at the 23rd percentile of this
distribution. We infer that a boom-bust of the sort observed in the U.S. is not particularly
unlikely from the perspective of our model.
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6.2 Analyzing model dynamics, case one
We now analyze model dynamics in case one at our calibrated parameter levels. In this
case, the pdf of the skeptical agents has the lowest entropy (es < eo < ev). The resulting
social dynamics are displayed in Figure 1(a), while Figure 5 describes various features of
the model along a path on which uncertainty is not realized. The key features of this path
can be summarized as follows. First, average home prices rise and then fall as the infection
waxes and wanes. Even though agents have perfect foresight up to the resolution of long-
run uncertainty, the initial rise in price is very small. Second, the average transaction price
commoves strongly with the number of potential buyers. Third, the number of transactions
commoves strongly with the average house price. Fourth, as prices rise, there is a sellers
marketin the sense that the probability of selling is high and the probability of buying is
low.
Consistent with our discussion in Section 3, movements in the number of potential buyers
are the key drivers of price dynamics in the model. Over time, the number of potential buyers
rises from roughly 1:9 percent to a peak value of roughly 13:6 percent of the population and
then declines.
In the boom phase of the cycle, the number of potential buyers rises for two reasons.
First, in contrast to the model without social dynamics, optimistic natural renters want to
buy homes. At the peak of the infection, roughly 21 percent of natural renters are optimistic
and account for 42 percent of potential buyers (see Figure 5). Second, as more buyers enter
the market, the average amount of time to purchase a house rises from 6 to 37 months, while
the average time to sell a house drops from 6 months to just over 1 month. To understand
these results, recall that the probabilities of buying and selling a home depend on the ratio
of buyers to sellers (see equations (46) and (47)). Other things equal, the inow of optimistic
natural renters into the housing market increases the number of buyers, thereby lowering the
probability of buying a house and raising the probability of selling a house. The latter e¤ect
reduces the stock of unhappy home owners, thus reinforcing the fall in the probability of
buying and the rise in the probability of selling a house. As the infection wanes, the number
of buyers falls and the number of sellers rises, so the probabilities of buying and selling a
house return to their steady state values.
To understand how changes in the number of buyers and sellers a¤ect prices, we exploit
the intuition about transition dynamics discussed in Section 4. The average purchase price
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is a weighted average of the price paid by four types of agents: optimistic natural renters
and optimistic, skeptical and vulnerable natural buyers.
The price paid by each of these agents depends positively on their reservation price (see
equations (57) and (58)). Each reservation price is the di¤erence between the value to that
agent of being a home owner and a home buyer (see equations (52) and (54)). When the
probability of buying is low, the value functions of all potential buyers are low because it
is more di¢ cult to realize the utility gains from purchasing a home. When the probability
of selling is high, the value functions of unhappy home owners are high because it takes
less time to sell a home. The value functions of home owners are also high because, with
probability , they become unhappy home owners.
As more agents become optimistic, the probability of buying falls and the probability of
selling rises. As a result, the reservation prices of the di¤erent potential buyers rise, leading
to a rise in purchase prices.
From Figure 5 we see that the optimistic natural buyers pay the highest price. These
agents derive a high utility from owning a home and have a high expectation of ". The
next highest price is paid by skeptical natural buyers. These agents also derive a high utility
from owning a home but they have a lower expectation of " than optimistic natural buyers.
Vulnerable and skeptical natural buyers have the same expectation of " so they pay the
same price. Optimistic natural renters pay the lowest price. On the one hand, these agents
enjoy the house less than natural buyers. On the other hand, they have a higher expectation
of " than skeptical and vulnerable natural buyers. For the case being considered the rst
e¤ect outweighs the second e¤ect.
The presence of optimistic natural renters has two e¤ects. Taking the prices paid by other
agents as given, the presence of optimistic natural renters reduces the average price. However,
the presence of optimistic renters increases the number of potential buyers, thereby creating
a congestion e¤ect that reduces the probability of buying a home. As discussed above, this
reduction increases the transactions price paid by the other agents in the system. In our
example, the second e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect.
Quantifying the congestion e¤ect One way to quantify the importance of the conges-
tion e¤ect is to redo the experiment but not allow optimistic renters to purchase homes. By
construction, in this experiment the probability of buying and selling a home is constant,
since the number of potential buyers and sellers is una¤ected by the infection. It turns
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out that the average sale price is hardly a¤ected by social dynamics. The only reason for
average prices to go up in this experiment is a rise in the reservation price of optimistic
natural buyers. This price is the di¤erence between the value of a being a new home owner
who is optimistic, (1  )Ho(zt+1) + Uo(zt+1), and the value of being an optimistic natural
buyer, Bo(zt+1). The value of becoming a home owner increases if a vulnerable agent be-
comes optimistic. But the value of being an optimistic natural buyer also increases because
an optimistic agent has a high expected value of ". In contrast to the situation where the
congestion e¤ect is operative, here the probability of buying a home remains constant, so
there is no countervailing e¤ect on the optimistic natural buyersvalue functions. The net
result is a small increase in the reservation price of optimistic buyers.
What happens when uncertainty is resolved? Figure 6 shows the average behavior
of the price if uncertainty is realized in year 15. The solid line depicts the actual house price
up to the period when uncertainty is realized. The dashed line shows the average price path
that vulnerable/skeptical agents expect after uncertainty is realized. Interestingly, these
agents do not expect the price to converge immediately to its steady value after uncertainty
is realized. The reason is that, when uncertainty is resolved, the number of natural buyers
exceeds its steady state value. The transition to the steady state is governed by the transition
dynamics of the homogeneous expectations model. As emphasized in Section 3, when the
number of natural buyers exceeds its steady state value, the price converges to its steady
state value gradually from above.
Figure 6 helps us understand why a skeptical or vulnerable natural buyer is willing to
buy a house even around the peak in housing prices. At this point, the price is much higher
than the steady state price that these agents expect. Even if uncertainty is resolved in the
following period, agents expect the fall in the price to be relatively small because the number
of potential home buyers is signicantly above its steady state value. Even if a home buyer
becomes an unhappy home owner, the expected capital loss on the house is expected to be
relatively small. As a consequence, the gains from living in the house outweigh the expected
capital loss.
Optimistic agents expect a large capital gain when uncertainty is realized. The expected
gain is so large that it induces natural renters to try to purchase a home. They are willing to
do so because the expected gains from speculation outweigh their disposition to rent rather
than buy.
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Figure 6 shows that there is a discontinuous jump up or down in house prices when
uncertainty is realized. We do not observe these types of jumps in the data. The discontinuity
reects the stark nature of how information is revealed in the model. This feature would be
eliminated if information about long-run fundamentals gradually percolates throughout the
economy as in Du¢ e, Giroux and Manso (2010) and Andrei and Cujean (2013).
6.3 Analyzing model dynamics, case two
We now analyze model dynamics in case two at our calibrated parameter levels.20 In this case,
the pdf of the optimistic agents has the lowest entropy (eo < es < ev). The same economic
forces discussed above are at work here. The key di¤erence is that, absent resolution of
uncertainty, the entire population becomes optimistic (see Figure 1(b)). As a consequence,
the number of optimistic renters rises and remains high until uncertainty is resolved. So,
the number of potential buyers remains high and the congestion e¤ect is operative until
then. Not surprisingly, therefore, in case two the probability of buying (selling) remains
lower (higher) than in case one, until uncertainty is resolved. Consequently, the volume of
transactions does not return to its original steady state level.
Finally, Figure 7 displays the price path absent resolution of uncertainty. As in case one,
the signicant boom phase of the price rise takes place before year 15. The boom is larger
than in case one, reecting the larger number of potential buyers. After year 15, the price
continues to rise slowly until uncertainty is resolved.
6.4 Expected price paths
We now discuss the properties of the time-zero expectations of time-t prices for optimistic
and skeptical agents. For t > 0 these are
Ej0(Pt) = (1  )tP [Gt(z0)] +
tX
=1
(1  ) 1
X
"2
f j(")P

Gt  [G (z0)]; "
	
. (61)
The rst term in equation (61) reects the possibility that uncertainty has not yet been
resolved by the end of time t. The probability of this event, (1   )t, is multiplied by
P [Gt(z0)], the price at time t in that state of the world. Here Gt(), is the law of motion of
the state variables invoked t times, so it represents zt. The second term in equation (61)
reects the possibility that uncertainty is resolved at time   t, an event that occurs with
20For computational reasons, we assume that  = 65 in case two.
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probability (1  ) 1. This probability is multiplied by the price that agent j expects to
occur at time t if uncertainty is realized at time  . Here, Gt  [G (z0)] represents zt since
G (z0) represents z , z represents z and Gt  () represents the law of motion after the
resolution of uncertainty invoked t   times.
Figure 8(a) depicts, for case one, the price paths expected by di¤erent agents. Optimistic
agents expect prices to rise rapidly until year 17 and to remain relatively high. Skeptical
agents expect prices to rise up to year 13, although by less than optimistic agents. Thereafter,
skeptical agents expect prices to revert gradually to their old steady state levels.
Figure 8(b) depicts, for case two, the price paths expected by di¤erent agents. The key
property to notice is that, while there are quantitative di¤erences, the patterns are remark-
ably similar. Skeptical agents expect a boom that is followed by a bust while optimistic
agents expect a boom that is not followed by a bust. Qualitatively this is the same result
that we obtained with the frictionless model of Section 3. Once again, an econometrician
taking repeated samples from our data would see both boom-busts and booms that are not
followed by busts. The boom-bust episodes typically occur in economies where the skeptical
agents happen to be correct. The booms that are not followed by busts typically occur in
economies in which optimistic agents happen to be correct.
7 Some additional evidence on key mechanisms in the
model
In this section, we present some additional evidence on the mechanisms at work in our
model. Our model attributes a key role to buyers with speculative motives. Booms (busts)
are marked by increases (decreases) in the number of agents who buy homes primarily
because of large expected capital gains (natural renters). It is obviously di¢ cult to measure
the importance of such buyers. However, the Michigan Survey of Consumers provides us
with some indirect information. The survey includes the question: is it a good time to buy
a home because it is a good investment?Figure 9 displays the percentage of respondents
answering yes to this question from 1996 to 2012, along with the percentage change in the
ination-adjusted Case-Shiller national price index. There is a clear increase in the number
of respondents who thought housing was a good investment during the boom period and a
sharp decline during the bust phase.
Suppose we assume that a rise in the number of rst-time buyers is likely to come from the
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pool of natural renters. Then, an additional piece of evidence consistent with our model is
that housing booms are accompanied by an increase in the number of rst-time buyers. Data
from the Current Population Survey show that the number of homes owned by individuals
29 years old and younger increased by 34 percent between 1994 and 2005 and decreased by
20 percent between 2005 and 2012. The numbers are even more dramatic for individuals
age 25 and younger, with the rise and fall equalling 73 and 24 percent, respectively. In a
similar vein, Holmans (1995) documents a large rise and fall in the number of rst-time
buyers during the U.K. boom-bust episode of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Evidence along
the same lines comes from the housing expectations survey data used by Case, Shiller, and
Thompson (2012). From 2003 on, rst-time buyers had consistently higher expectations of
price appreciation than other buyers. The di¤erence between the one-year ahead rate of
return expected by rst-time buyers and other buyers ranges from 1:1 percent in 2003 to 5:4
percent in 2006. Taken together, the previous evidence is supportive of the important role
that our model ascribes to speculative buyers in boom and bust episodes.
A core implication of our model is that a boom (bust) in house prices is associated with
an increase (decrease) in the probability of selling a house. To assess this implication, we use
data from the National Association of Realtors on inventories and sales of existing homes
covering the period 1999 to 2012. We compute the monthly probability of a sale as the ratio
of sales to inventories of existing homes for sale. The annual probability of a sale is the
average of the monthly probabilities in a given year. Figure 9 shows that there is a striking
comovement between this probability and the rate of change in the ination-adjusted Case-
Shiller price index. Both series rise from 1999 until the end of 2005 and then drop sharply
until 2008 before recovering.
Our model also implies that booms (busts) are associated with an increase (decrease) in
the volume of transactions. Figure 9 provides empirical evidence on the volume of transac-
tions. Transaction volume rose, reaching a peak in 2005, before falling dramatically through
2009. This pattern is consistent with evidence in Stein (1995).
Recall that, according to our model, an unusually large number of potential buyers enter
the market during booms. Their desire to purchase a home is primarily driven by speculative
motives. The entry of these agents makes it easier to sell existing homes and increases the
overall level of activity in the housing market. During the bust phase speculative buyers exit
the market driving down the probability of selling a home and the volume of transactions.
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So, our model implies that the extensive margin plays a critical role in house price dynamics.
Taken together, we interpret the evidence in Figure 9 as supportive of this implication.
8 Conclusion
Boom-bust episodes are pervasive in housing markets. They occur in di¤erent countries
and in di¤erent time periods. These episodes are hard to understand from the perspective
of conventional models in which agents have homogeneous expectations. In this paper we
propose a model in which agents have di¤erent views about long-run fundamentals. Social
interactions can generate temporary increases in the fraction of agents who hold a particular
view about long-run fundamentals. The resulting dynamics can produce boom-bust cycles
as well as booms that are not followed by busts.
Our model abstracts from nancial frictions. It is clear to us that the ability of many
young buyers to buy a home is inuenced by down-payment requirements and credit condi-
tions. An implication of our model is that if young buyers are optimistic but cannot buy a
house, say because they are credit constrained, boom-bust cycles in house prices are greatly
muted. Indeed, this situation corresponds to the experiment in our model where we lock
out optimistic natural renters from the housing market. In this case there are no congestion
e¤ects and there are no pronounced boom-bust cycles. But there is no presumption that
a policy of requiring high down-payments would be welfare improving because this policy
would presumably apply to both natural buyers and natural renters. More generally, poli-
cies aimed at curbing rapid price increases are not obviously welfare improving in our model
because, in the end, we do not know who is right about the future: the vulnerable, the
skeptical, or the optimistic.
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A Appendix A: Internalizing changes in agent type
In the main text we assume that agents do not take into account the possibility that they
may change their type as a result of social interactions. Here we assess the quantitative
impact of this assumption by calculating equilibrium prices when agents do internalize the
possibility that they may change their type.
In case one, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents become skeptical as t goes to
innity and the terminal price is equal to the fundamental price of a skeptical agent (P s in
equation (12)). In case two, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents become optimistic
as t goes to innity and the terminal price is equal to the fundamental price of an optimistic
agent (P o in equation (11)). Using these terminal prices we can compute the equilibrium
price path in a recursive fashion.
When ot  k, optimistic agents are the marginal home owners. In this case the equilib-
rium price is given by:
Pt = (1  sost)

Eo(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

+
sost

Es(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

.
Recall that Pt+1 and P t+1 are the t + 1 prices when uncertainty is not realized and when
uncertainty is realized, respectively. Here an optimistic agent takes into into account that
with probability sost he becomes skeptical at time t+1 and values the house as a skeptical
agent. The value of so is positive in case one but equal to zero in case two.
When ot < k and ot + vt  k vulnerable agents are the marginal home owners even if
st  k. Vulnerable agents have higher valuations than skeptical agents because they have a
higher probability of becoming optimistic. In this case the equilibrium price is given by:
Pt = (1  ovot   svst)

Ev(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

+ovot

Eo(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

+
+svst

Es(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

.
Here the vulnerable agent takes into account that with probability ovot he becomes opti-
mistic and values the house as an optimistic agent. Also, with probability svst he becomes
skeptical and values the house as a skeptical agent.
Finally, when ot < k and ot + vt < k the marginal home owner is a skeptical agent. In
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this case the equilibrium price is given by:
Pt = 
osot

Eo(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

+
(1  osot)

Es(" + P t+1) + (1  )("+ Pt+1)

.
Here the skeptical agent takes into account that, with probability osot he becomes optimistic
and values the house as an optimistic agent. Recall that os is zero in case one but it is
positive in case two.
We redo the experiment that underlies Figure 2 using the same parameter values. The
basic nding is that internalizing changes in agent type makes virtually no di¤erence to our
results. The basic reason is that the probability of switching types is small. For instance,
in case one the maximum value of ovot and sost in our numerical example are three and
one-third of one percent, respectively. In the following sections we abstract from this e¤ect
to simplify our computations.
B Appendix B: An alternative interpretation of social
dynamics
In this appendix we describe an alternative environment which generates social dynamics
that are similar to those of our model. In this example agents have heterogeneous priors
and receive private signals. Suppose that the agents who are initially optimistic or skeptical
have very sharp priors. Agents that are initially vulnerable have very di¤use priors. All
agents receive uninformative private signals. Vulnerable agents have sharp priors that the
posteriors of optimistic and skeptical agents are the product of initially di¤use priors and
very informative signals. So, when a vulnerable agent meets an optimistic (skeptical) agent
his posterior becomes arbitrarily close to that of the optimistic (skeptical) agent. We refer to
a vulnerable agent who has a posterior that is very close to that of an optimistic (skeptical)
agent as optimistic (skeptical).
We reinterpret lj as the probability that agents of type l meet agents of type j. We
assume that vs = vo =  and that so = 0, i.e. skeptical and optimistic agents have
no social interactions. Under our assumptions the dynamics of the fraction of population
with di¤erent views are similar to those generated by our model of social dynamics. Our
assumptions about lj eliminate the convergence of posteriors that is a generic property of
Bayesian environments. As a result, we preserve the property that di¤erent agents agree
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to disagree.21 To obtain dynamics similar to cases 1 and 2 we need to introduce a slight
asymmetry between skeptical and optimistic agents. A simple, albeit mechanical, way to
introduce this asymmetry is to suppose that in case one (case two) a small fraction  of
optimistic (skeptical) agents exogenously change their view to those of skeptical (optimistic)
agents.
The view of social segmentation embodied in our assumptions about lj is consistent with
the notion that agents who are strongly committed to a point of view limit their interactions
to sources of information and individuals that are likely to conrm their own views. This
phenomenon is discussed by Sunstein (2001) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). The
latter authors summarize research in psychology, communications and information theory
that is consistent with the social-segmentation hypothesis. More recently, Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2011) nd evidence that people tend to have close social interactions with people
who have similar political views. Social segmentation is related to what sociologists call
homophily: contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than contact among
dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook (2001)).
C Appendix C
In this appendix we describe the laws of motion for the fractions of the population accounted
for by the twelve types of agents in the model of Section 5. The values of lj, which depend
on the ratio of the entropies of the pdfs of agents l and j, are dened in equation (3). Recall
that os = 0 in case one and so = 0 in case two.
Home owners We denote the fraction of home owners of type j (j = o; s; v) in the
beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and
after purchases and sales occur by hjt , (h
j
t)
0, (hjt)
00, and hjt+1, respectively. The laws of motion
for these variables are given by:
(hjt)
0 = hjt(1  ), j = o; s; v, (62)
(hvt )
00 = (hvt )
0   sv (hvt )0 st   ov(hvt )0ot, (63)
(hst)
00 = (hst)
0 + sv (hvt )
0 st   os (hst)0 ot + so (hot )0 st, (64)
21Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide an alternative environment in which agents agree to disagree because
they are uncertain about the interpretation of the signals that they receive.
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(hot )
00 = (hot )
0 + ov (hvt )
0 ot   so (hot )0 st + os (hst)0 ot, (65)
hjt+1 = (h
j
t)
00 + qb(zt)J b;j(zt)(b
j
t)
00 + qb(zt)Jr;j(zt)(r
j
t )
00, j = o; s; v. (66)
Unhappy home owners We denote the fraction of unhappy home owners of type j (j =
o; s; v) in the beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions
occur, and after purchases and sales occur by ujt , (u
j
t)
0, (ujt)
00, and ujt+1, respectively. The
laws of motion for these variables are given by:
(ujt)
0 = ujt + h
j
t , j = o; s; v, (67)
(uvt )
00 = (uvt )
0   sv (uvt )0 st   ov(uvt )0ot, (68)
(ust)
00 = (ust)
0 + sv (uvt )
0 st   os (ust)0 ot + so (uot )0 st, (69)
(uot )
00 = (uot )
0 + ov (uvt )
0 ot   so (uot )0 st + os (ust)0 ot, (70)
ujt+1 = (u
j
t)
00   qs(zt)Ju;j(zt)(ujt)00, j = o; s; v. (71)
Natural buyers We denote the fraction of natural buyers of type j (j = o; s; v) in the
beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and
after purchases and sales occur by bjt , (b
j
t)
0, (bjt)
00, and bjt+1, respectively. The laws of motion
for these variables are given by:
(bjt)
0 = bjt + r
j
t , j = o; s; v, (72)
(bvt )
00 = (bvt )
0   sv (bvt )0 st   ov(bvt )0ot, (73)
(bst)
00 = (bst)
0 + sv (bvt )
0 st   os (bst)0 ot + so (bot )0 st, (74)
(bot )
00 = (bot )
0 + ov (bvt )
0 ot   so(bot )0st + os (bst)0 ot, (75)
bjt+1 = (b
j
t)
00   qb(zt)J b;j(zt)(bjt)00, j = o; s; v. (76)
Natural renters We denote the fraction of natural renters of type j (j = o; s; v) in the
beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and
after purchases and sales occur by rjt , (r
j
t )
0, (rjt )
00, and rjt+1, respectively. The laws of motion
for these variables are given by:
(rjt )
0 = rjt (1  ), j = o; s; v, (77)
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(rvt )
00 = (rvt )
0   sv (rvt )0 st   ov(rvt )0ot, (78)
(rst )
00 = (rst )
0 + sv (rvt )
0 st   os(rst )0ot + so(rot )0st, (79)
(rot )
00 = (rot )
0 + ov (rvt )
0 ot   so(rot )0st + os(rst )0ot, (80)
rjt+1 = (r
j
t )
00   qb(zt)Jr;j(zt)(rjt )00 + qs(zt)Ju;j(zt)(ujt)00, j = o; s; v. (81)
Limiting steady state when uncertainty is not realized, case one We denote by
H("), U("), B(") and R(") the steady state of the value functions of di¤erent agents in
the economy when uncertainty is realized and the realized utility of owning a home is ".
These values are computed by solving the system of equations (23), (24), (28), (29), (32),
(31), and (44), setting B = Bbuy and R = Rrent and replacing " in equation (23) with the
di¤erent possible values of ". Then let
V j =
X
"2
f j(")V (z; ") (82)
where V represents H, U , B or R, and z = (h; b)0 with h and b being the steady state
values of h and b from Section 3. The limiting value functions of di¤erent agents along a
path in which uncertainty is not resolved can be obtained by solving the following system of
equations for Hj, U j, Bj, Rj, and Pb;s and for j = o; v; s, unless indicated otherwise:
Hj = "+ f(1  ) (1  )Hj + U j) + [(1  ) Hj +  U j]g, (83)
U j = qsPj + qs (1  ) (1  )Rj + Bj+  (1  ) Rj +  Bj	+
(1  qs)[(1  )U j +  U j] (84)
Pu;j = 
1 +  

(1  ) U j   (1  )Rj   Bj+   U j   (1  ) Rj    Bj	 . (85)
Bj = "  w   qbPb;j + qb (1  ) (1  )Hj + U j+  (1  ) Hj +  U j	+
(1  qb)[(1  )Bj +  Bj] (86)
Pb;j =  (1  )[(1  )Hj + U j   Bj] +  (1  ) Hj +  U j   Bj	 . (87)
Rj = "  ! +  (1  ) (1  )Rj + Bj+  (1  ) Rj +  Bj	 , j = s; v (88)
Ro = "  w   qb(Pr;o + ") + qb (1  ) [(1  )Ho + Uo] +  (1  ) Ho +  U o	+
(1  qb) (1  ) [(1  )Ro + Bo] +  (1  ) Ro +  Bo	 (89)
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Pr;j = (1  ) (1  )Hj + U j   (1  )Rj   Bj+


(1  ) Hj +  U j   (1  ) Rj    Bj  ". (90)
Recall that in the limit all agents are skeptical, and we have conjectured that skeptical
natural renters do not choose to buy, thus simplifying expressions for average prices:
Pb;j =  Pb;j + (1  ) Pu;s (91)
Pr;j =  Pr;j(zt) + (1  ) Pu;s (92)
Pj =  Pb;s(zt) + (1  ) Pu;j(zt). (93)
P = Ps (94)
The probabilities of buying and selling are given by:
qs = qb = . (95)
Limiting steady state when uncertainty is not realized, case two In case two all
agents become optimistic in the limit when uncertainty is not realized. Given our conjectured
optimal decision rules, optimistic natural buyers and natural renters choose to buy homes
prior to the resolution of uncertainty. This means that the limiting populations, ht, ut, bt
and rt do not correspond to their initial steady state values. This is because the initial steady
state is a constant solution to equations (36)(41) and (45)(47) with Jr = 0, whereas here
the limiting case is a constant solution to equations (36)(41) and (45)(47) with Jr = 1.
We denote the values of ht, bt, qst and q
b
t in this limiting case as ~h, ~b, ~q
s and ~qb and we let
~z = (~h;~b)0.22
Next we denote byH(~z; "), U(~z; "), B(~z; ") and R(~z; ") the value functions of di¤erent
agents in the economy when uncertainty is realized and the realized utility of owning a home
is ". These values are computed using the same methods we used to compute utilities for
the transitions dynamics case in Section 3. Then we dene
V j =
X
"2
f j(")V (~z; ") (96)
22In solving the model for Case 2 we have to make a minor modication to the matching technology, and
write it as
mt = minfSellerst Buyers1 t ;Sellerst;Buyerstg:
This ensures that the probabilities of buying and selling are bounded between zero and one. In solving Case
1 we found that these constraints never bind. In Case 2, in the limiting case, ~qs = 1.
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where V represents H, U , B or R. With this di¤erent denition of V j in place, and using
~qs and ~qb in place of qs and qb, we can solve for the limiting value functions and reservation
prices of di¤erent agents along a path in which uncertainty is not resolved using equations
(83)(90). Since, in the limit, all agents are optimistic, the expressions for average prices
are:
Pb;j =  Pb;j + (1  ) Pu;o (97)
Pr;j =  Pr;j(zt) + (1  ) Pu;o (98)
Pj =  [
~b+ (1  k   ~b)] Pb;o + (1  )(1  k   ~b) Pr;o
1  k + (1  )
Pu;j. (99)
P = Po (100)
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FIGURE 1: Social Dynamics
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Note: The graphs show the evolution of the populations of each type of agent due to social
dynamics. In case one, the priors of skeptical agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors
of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. In case two, the priors of optimistic agents
have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
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FIGURE 2: Equilibrium of Frictionless Model, Case One
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Note: The graphs show a variety of paths for the frictionless model with social dynamics in
case one, in which the priors of skeptical agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of
the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The number of optimistic agents, the price
of a house, the monthly expected rate of return, and transactions volume are all computed
under the assumption that uncertainty is not realized. The expected price paths are the
expected values of the house price at each date, as of time 0, given the priors of the di¤erent
agents.
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FIGURE 3: Equilibrium of Frictionless Model, Case Two
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Note: The graphs show a variety of paths for the frictionless model with social dynamics in
case two, in which the priors of optimistic agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of
the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The number of optimistic agents, the price
of a house, the monthly expected rate of return, and transactions volume are all computed
under the assumption that uncertainty is not realized. The expected price paths are the
expected values of the house price at each date, as of time 0, given the priors of the di¤erent
agents.
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FIGURE 4: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(a) Prices, Buyers, Sellers and Transaction Probabilities
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Note: The gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. Buyers indicates the
number of agents who try to buy a home, while sellers indicates the number of agents who
try to sell a home. Price is the average price at which homes are sold. Bs reservation price
is the reservation price of a natural home buyer. Figure 4 continues on the next page.
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FIGURE 4: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(b) Utility Levels of the Di¤erent Agents
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
Price
0 5 10 15 20
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
# of Buyers
0 5 10 15 20
0.1
0.13
0.16
0.19
0.22
0.25
Probability of Buying
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
Reserv ation Prices
years
Buyers
Sellers
0 5 10 15 20
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
# of Sellers
years
0 5 10 15 20
0.1
0.13
0.16
0.19
0.22
0.25
Probability of Selling
years
Note: The gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. The utility levels of
the four types of agents are indicated. Figure 4 continues on the next page.
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FIGURE 4: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(c) Agent Populations, Transactions Volume and Transaction Probabilities
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Note: The gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. The four plots on
the left show the number of agents of each type across the transition path. Sales indicates
the number of transactions.
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FIGURE 5: Equilibrium of Matching Model with Social Dynamics, Case One
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Note: The gures illustrate equilibrium paths when there is no resolution of uncertainty for
the matching model with social dynamics in case one, in which the priors of skeptical agents
have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
The number of potential buyers is calculated after preferences shocks have been realized.
Here, bs, bv and bo represent the populations of skeptical, vulnerable and optimistic natural
buyers, while ro is the population of optimistic natural renters.
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FIGURE 6: Expected Prices after the Resolution of Uncertainty, Case One
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Note: The gure illustrates the equilibrium price (solid black line) if uncertainty is not
realized until the end of year 15. The blue dashed line indicates the prices the skeptical and
vulnerable agents would expect to observe after year 15, if uncertainly were resolved at that
date.
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FIGURE 7: Equilibrium of Matching Model with Social Dynamics, Case Two
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Note: The gures illustrate equilibrium paths when there is no resolution of uncertainty for
the matching model with social dynamics in case two, in which the priors of optimistic agents
have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
The number of potential buyers is calculated after preferences shocks have been realized.
Here, bs, bv and bo represent the populations of skeptical, vulnerable and optimistic natural
buyers, while ro is the population of optimistic natural renters.
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FIGURE 8: Expected Price Paths, Matching Model with Social Dynamics
(a) Case one
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(b) Case two
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Note: The graphs show the price paths expected by di¤erent types of agents at time 0.
In case one, the priors of skeptical agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the
vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. In case two, the priors of optimistic agents have
the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
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FIGURE 9: Sentiment, Housing Transactions and House Price Changes
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(a) Michigan Survey Sentiment & Real House Price Changes
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(b) Probability of Selling & Real House Price Changes
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(c) Sales of Existing Homes & Real House Price Changes
Note: In all panels the dashed line is the percentage change in the ination-adjusted Case-
Shiller national house price index. Panel (a) shows survey data from the Michigan Survey
of Consumers. The solid line shows the percentage of respondents answering yes to the
question: is it a good time to buy a home because it is a good investment?Panels (b) and
(c) show data from the National Association of Realtors. Panel (b) shows the probability of
selling (the ratio of sales to inventories for existing homes) as the solid line. Panel (c) shows
sales of existing homes as the solid line.
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TABLE 1: Parameter Values, Matching Model
Parameter Value Description
Parameters calibrated using the steady state properties of the model
k 0:65 Fraction of home owners in population
 0:995 Discount factor
" 1 Utility of owning a home
" 1 Utility of renting, natural buyer and renter
w 1 Rental rate
 0:50 Parameter of matching function
 0:163 Parameter of matching function
 0:011 Preference shock, natural renters
 0:0058 Preference shock, home owners
 62 Fixed cost of buying, natural renters
 0:50 Bargaining power of home buyer
Parameters calibrated to survey data
Eo(") 2:89 Mean of optimistists prior
 0:0038 Monthly probability that uncertainty is realized
 0:358 Opportunity cost, unhappy home owner
es=ev 0:890 Relative entropies of skeptical and vulnerable agentspriors
eo=ev 0:894 Relative entropies of optimistic and vulnerable agentspriors
 2:87 10 6 Initial number of skeptical and optimistic agents
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TABLE 2. Homeowner Beliefs: Statistics from Survey Data
Data Model
Case-Shiller Mean Expected Price Appreciation
2003 5.3 7.4
2005 7.9 7.1
2006 3.6 7.1
Case-Shiller Mean-Median Expected Price Appreciation
2003 0.6 2.0
2005 1.9 1.9
2006 2.0 1.9
American Housing Survey (AHS): Mean-Median House Valuation
1997 0.0 -0.3
1999 4.3 3.1
2001 10.7 12.7
2003 14.4 16.8
2005 20.0 17.9
2006 19.7 18.3
Notes: Under Case-Shiller-Thompsonthe table reports the mean and mean minus median
expected house price appreciation from homeowner surveys presented in Case, and Shiller
(2010). We use data from three cities (Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco) and convert
nominal forecasts to real as described in the main text. Under Model we report the
analog gures from our model treating 2006 as the peak of the house price boom. Under
American Housing Surveywe report statistics based on the bi-annual American Housing
Survey (AHS), in which the Bureau of the Census asks homeowners the question: How much
do you think your house would sell for on todays market?We use responses collected in
Boston, Los Angeles and San Francisco. We report the average percentage di¤erence between
the median and the mean valuation for these cities. Figures for 2006 are interpolated from
the 2005 and 2007 surveys. Under Modelwe report the analog gures from our model
when we treat 2006 as the peak of the house price boom. These are based on the mean and
median utility levels of homeowners and home sellers in our model. An asterisk () indicates
a survey moment that is included in our calibration exercise.
67
